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CHAPTER ONE:  Introduction 
This study will examine the role of severity effects and electiveness in 
medical malpractice litigation.  The influence of severity effects within the legal 
setting has been widely studied with varying results, which may be due to the lack of 
a consistent, situational context across all studies.  Consequently, the inconclusive 
findings of prior research suggest it may be more productive to study the influence of 
severity effects within a specific context such as medical malpractice.  Furthermore, 
this research will introduce electiveness as an additional extra-legal factor which 
influences the attribution of responsibility in instances of medical malpractice. 
Attribution of responsibility lies at the heart of our professional, social, and 
political existence.  Professionally, it organizes and defines the roles within the 
corporate entities of which we are employed.  It functions as a basis for the division 
of labor along with the initiation, promotion and termination of our careers.  Outside 
of our careers, responsibility attribution organizes our social lives.  It defines the 
relationships among our inner circles and shapes our perceptions of those around us 
and the meaning of their actions.  On a larger social scale, responsibility attribution 
defines the roles and responsibilities associated with one’s placement within the 
larger community and society.  Finally, responsibility attribution defines our political 
identities.  It engenders a conception of free will, which underpins our geopolitical 
identities (Arendt, 1969).  In a society of laws, it dictates and renders judgment on 
appropriate and inappropriate behavior and the consequences associated with each 
area of our lives (Feigenson, 2000).   
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 Responsibility is a central characteristic of human agency.  The ability to 
reflect upon choices and assign meaning to the implications of those choices has led 
some to argue the notion of responsibility is definitive of human agency (Arendt, 
1969; Conte & Paolucci, 2004; Feigenson, 2000; Weiner, 1995).  Whereas choice 
regards the selection of competing options, responsibility attribution establishes the 
links within the social web of action, roles, identities, and relationships.  It is a 
projection of meaning on to this social web.  Accepting responsibility for a choice 
extends well beyond mere selection.  It establishes a relationship between an agent 
and an act.  Conte and Paolucci (2004) have described responsibility as implying 
“deliberative capacity (free will, etc.)” in which “only autonomous and deliberative 
agents can be responsible for given events, both negative and positive.” 
Weiner (1995) offers further support for this view, suggesting that judgments 
of responsibility are “a pervasive feature of our social existence.”  Feigenson (2000) 
noted such judgments “define ourselves:  how we think and feel about what happens 
to us and others.”  Other researchers have argued humans organize both the physical 
and social world through cause and responsibility (Heider, 1958; Phares & Wilson, 
1972).  Without such capabilities, humans would find themselves unable to make 
sense of the external world.   
The study of responsibility dates back to Aristotle, who characterized 
responsibility holders as “decision-makers endowed with the capacity to foresee 
consequences of action (or inaction) and choose accordingly” (Conte & Paolucci, 
2004).  For Aristotle, responsibility pertained to an obligation one has to achieve the 
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greater good (Furley, 1997).  “The central issue for Aristotle is the question of 
character or personality — what does it take for an individual human being to be a 
good person” (Furley, 1997).   This early acknowledgment highlights the manner in 
which responsibility has developed in relation to questions of morality, which 
continue to shape our conception of responsibility today. 
Aristotle’s representation implies five fundamental tenets of responsibility:  
anticipation, self-reflection, agency, free will and proper judgment.  Together, these 
five tenets are necessary functions of human agency which influence the assignment 
of responsibility to an individual. 
Anticipation denotes the ability or expectation to foresee the consequences of 
a choice.  In order for an individual to be held responsible for an action, he or she 
must either be capable of foreseeing or reasonably expected to have foreseen the 
consequences of his or her actions.  The individual’s capability to foresee such 
consequences derive from experience and/or social knowledge.  For example, if a 
person drives a car after consuming alcohol and causes an accident, he or she will be 
held responsible for his or her actions because there exists a social knowledge that it 
is dangerous to consume alcohol and drive an automobile.   
However, one can be held responsible where no such social knowledge exists 
if there is a preceding experience which establishes an expectation for a potential 
outcome.  For example, if an individual experienced recent problems with the brakes 
failing on his or her automobile and, while driving, a brake failure causes him or her 
to get in to an accident and injure another person, he or she will be held responsible.  
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While it is not social knowledge that one should expect his brakes to fail, this 
individual has prior experiences which should have led him or her to expect that such 
an incident could occur.   
There are instances where an individual could not have anticipated the 
possibility of a particular outcome in which the individual is typically not held 
responsible for the outcome.  For example, if the same individual involved in the 
automobile accident resulting from brake failure had no prior indication the brakes 
would or could fail, he is less likely to be held responsible for the resulting injuries.   
The next tenet of responsibility is self-reflection.  Self-reflection refers to an 
awareness or ability to understand a relationship between one’s actions and the 
resulting consequences.  This requires both a mental state and capability to 
understand that one’s actions are the cause of a particular set of consequences.  This 
suggests the individual must be capable of understanding he or she is responsible for 
the consequences.  While this tenet might be viewed as one of lesser importance in 
regards to the assignment of responsibility to an individual for his or her acts (i.e. he 
caused it regardless of whether or not he or she realizes he or she caused it), it is a 
standard which is frequently deployed in criminal trials.  Furthermore, Martin (1998) 
suggests it is a necessary moral check in a system designed to uphold justice and 
fairness.   
There are two particular instances within a trial setting in which one’s mental 
state or capabilities are used as a standard for adjudication.  The first is the insanity 
defense, which refers to “a plea that defendants are not guilty because they lacked the 
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mental capacity to realize that they committed a wrong or appreciate why it was 
wrong” (Martin, 1998).  The insanity defense essentially proposes the individual’s 
state of mind precluded him from understanding the implications of his actions and 
acting in accordance with such an understanding.  Consequently, this preclusion 
prevents him or her from being held responsible for his actions. 
A second instance in which one’s mental state or capabilities are used as a 
standard for assigning responsibility stems from the recent Atkins v. Virginia 
Supreme Court ruling (CNN, 2002).  This 6-3 ruling prevents states from executing 
mentally retarded individuals.  Proponents of this decision argue, “because of their 
mental retardation, these men and women cannot understand fully what they did 
wrong and many cannot even comprehend the punishment that awaits them. While 
they have the bodies of adults, in crucial ways their mental function is more like that 
of children” (Human Rights Watch Report, 2001). 
The Atkins v. Virginia ruling highlights society’s acknowledgement that an 
individual, in order to be held responsible for his or her actions, must be capable of 
understanding that he or she has done something wrong and why the particular action 
was wrong.   
The standards established under the Atkins v. Virginia ruling and the insanity 
defense have faced widespread criticism.  For some, the issue is quite simple:  an 
individual should be held responsible for his or her actions regardless of whether or 
not he or she is capable of understanding he or she is responsible.  Typically, this 
criticism manifests itself in instances where violent crimes have been committed.  For 
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those close to the crime, it is often unfathomable that someone could commit such a 
crime and escape responsibility for it under what they see as a “technicality.”  
Consequently, there have been numerous attempts to erode the insanity defense or 
force stricter applications of the exemption.  Even Supreme Court Justice Anthony 
Scalia expressed his harsh criticism of the Atkins ruling.  However, for the time 
being, the mental state/competence standard has been upheld as the majority view. 
The third tenet of responsibility is agency.  Agency refers to the ability, 
authority, or power to affect consequence.  Under this tenet, the individual must 
possess the ability to effectuate change.  In other words, he or she must be capable of 
influencing the outcome.  This may include physical, hierarchal, or authoritative 
capabilities.  For example, if an individual is driving a car and is rear-ended, which 
propels him into the car in front of him, resulting in an injury to that person, he is 
unlikely to be held responsible for that injury.  While his car hit the car in front of 
him and technically caused the damage to that car, he was hit from behind, which 
propelled his car into the car in front of him.  In this instance, the individual in 
question had no physical control over the car behind him which instigated the chain 
of events.  Therefore, it was not within his power to prevent the injury to the car in 
front of him.  Consequently, he is unlikely to be held responsible for the injuries to 
the person in the car in front of him. 
Agency also includes capabilities associated with authority and/or social 
power.  For example, if a graduate teaching instructor is instructed by her department 
to fail a student for plagiarizing a term paper, the graduate teaching instructor is not 
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responsible for the choice of punishment.  While the instructor may have caught the 
act of plagiarism, reported it to the department and reported the punishment back to 
the student, it is not within the instructor’s authority to over-ride the decision by the 
department to fail the student.  Therefore, the instructor is not held accountable for 
the choice of punishment.   
The fourth tenet of responsibility is free will.  Free will entails the freedom to 
make a choice without constraint.  This requires an individual be free of coercion, 
physical, and social constraints in making a choice.  Without such freedom, the 
individual cannot be held responsible for his or her actions.  For example, in the 
scenario where the individual causes an accident because he was intoxicated while 
driving, if he had been forced to get into the car and drive, against his will, by another 
person holding a gun, the individual would not be held responsible for his actions.  In 
this instance, it was not his choice to get in the car and drive.  Rather, he was 
physically coerced to perform an action that resulted in injuries.           
Joseph and Tedeschi (1983) conducted a study examining the relationship 
between coercion/constraints and the harm induced by the actions of an individual.  
They found attribution of responsibility requires a complex analysis of the 
relationship between the levels of coercion and the level of resulting harm.  
Specifically, Joseph and Tedeschi (1983) isolated three issues.  First, coercion is not 
an acceptable justification when non-harmful alternatives were available to the actor.  
This acknowledges an individual may have options available that free him or her of 
the coercion.  Perhaps the individual being held at gunpoint had opportunities to 
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escape without harm.  If these opportunities existed and the individual did not take 
them, he or she can be held responsible for the resulting harm even though some level 
of coercion still existed. 
The other two issues pertain to the relationship between the amount of harm 
and the amount of coercion.  The second factor indicates, when the coercion exceeds 
the amount of harm, the individual should be perceived as constrained, justified, and 
not responsible for the harm.  Finally, the third factor indicates, when the amount of 
harm exceeds the amount of coercion, the individual should be perceived as 
unjustified and responsible for the harm. 
The final tenet of responsibility is proper judgment.  Proper judgment denotes 
the individual’s ability to make an appropriate decision.  This final tenet overlaps 
with the tenet of self-reflection.  Self-reflection signifies the individual’s awareness of 
a relationship between his actions and the resulting consequences.  In other words, the 
individual must be capable of understanding his actions caused the harm.  Proper 
judgment establishes, not only must an individual be capable of understanding the 
relationship between his actions and the resulting consequences, but also be capable 
of understanding and choosing the superior choice.  The individual must be capable 
of understanding the difference between right and wrong.   
The earlier examples of the insanity defense (Martin, 1998) and the Atkins v. 
Virginia ruling (CNN, 2002) acknowledge the additional requirement that the 
individual be capable of understanding right from wrong.  If the individual can not 
understand why the choices he made were wrong, he cannot be held responsible for 
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the act.  This standard is commonly used in disciplining children in the early stages of 
life.  For example, a three year-old turns on the water and floods the bathroom is 
unlikely to be held responsible because a three year-old is not capable of 
understanding why it was a poor decision to turn the water on and let it run.   
Each of these five tenets contributes to a framework for determining and 
attributing responsibility to another individual.  A failure to meet any single standard 
can raise significant questions regarding the accountability of the individual in 
question.  Furthermore, each of these standards rests upon moral and ontological 
assumptions of a given culture.   
An analysis of responsibility attribution becomes even more complex when 
separated from the notion of causality.  As noted in the earlier analysis of the five 
tenets of responsibility, responsibility does not consist of simply identifying the cause 
of a harm.  While causality and responsibility work in concert as human perception 
and cognition guide the elaborative processes that allow us to make sense of the 
social and physical world, these concepts are analytically distinct.  An ontological 
approach to the human understanding of cause highlights reasons for the divergence 
between the manner in which the “ordinary person” attributes responsibility and 
assesses causality.   
Perceptions of cause stem from human perception of the physical world.  In 
such instances, an individual observes a “structured connection” between two objects 
in which motion is transferred from one object to another (Michotte, 1941, 1963).  
For example, if one individual pushes another individual and the latter individual falls 
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down to the ground, an observer will conclude the first individual physically caused 
the second individual to fall down via the acting of the push.  Specifically, the 
physical force was transferred from the pusher to the individual who was pushed, 
causing him to fall.   
 On the other hand, attribution of responsibility organizes our social world, 
which includes our understanding of people and relationships.  It goes beyond the 
question of mere cause and seeks to address whether or not the first individual should 
be held accountable for his actions.  In addressing this issue, it becomes clear that 
cause and responsibility are closely interwoven, yet analytically distinct.  For 
example, the observer may conclude the first individual, while physically causing the 
second to fall via the push, is not responsible for the fall.   
 A variety of mediating factors influence the manner in which responsibility is 
assigned where physical cause is present.  In the preceding example, the observer’s 
knowledge of the first individual’s character may influence the responsibility 
assigned.  Perhaps the individual’s character is inconsistent with one who would 
intentionally try to injure another person.   Alternatively, the events preceding the 
push could influence the manner in which responsibility is assigned.  Perhaps the 
second individual who was pushed had been antagonizing the first individual and had 
engaged in physically aggressive behavior towards the first individual.  Again, this 
may lead the observer to conclude the first individual is not responsible for the fall 
even though he is the physical cause of the fall. 
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This example identifies only two mediating factors of cause and 
responsibility.  Because attribution of responsibility pertains to the social 
environment of humans, the list of possible mediating factors is endless.  However, 
the example highlights the underlying claim:  cause and responsibility are 
interconnected, yet distinct phenomenon of the human brain 
Today, the most common forum for questioning, assigning, and disputing 
causality and responsibility is the legal system.  Thomas Jefferson (1789) once noted 
in a letter to Abbe Arnoux that citizens “are not qualified to judge questions of law, 
but they are very capable of judging questions of fact.”  Implicit in this letter is 
Jefferson’s view of the importance of incorporating the layperson’s conception of 
accountability and responsibility into the everyday application of the law.  For 
Jefferson, the ability of citizens to render judgment on their peers was a fundamental 
principle of a democratic society in that it grounded the law in the morals of the 
people.  The Iowa State Bar Association recently added:  “Thomas Jefferson called 
the jury process the best of all possible safeguards for the person, property and 
reputation of every citizen. It was, in fact, the verdict of courageous jurors that 
established the right to a free press in America, as well as countless other rights and 
privileges that most Americans now take for granted. Jurors keep law in the United 
States close to the people, preserving a guarantee of freedom and democracy that 
many in the world are still struggling to achieve” (2005).   
Legal philosophers have embraced Jefferson’s words arguing legal 
conceptualizations of causal attribution and responsibility rest upon the 
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understandings of the “ordinary person” (Lloyd-Bostock, 1979; Hart & Honore, 
1961), meaning legal standards for attributing causal responsibility have roots within 
the fundamental understanding of cause and effect by the “person in the street.”  In 
today’s deliberation rooms, verdicts are guided by jury instructions and human sense-
making which rely upon the same standards Aristotle proposed centuries ago.  
The importance of understanding how responsibility is attributed can not be 
over-stated.  Recently, the National Safety Council’s Injury Facts Report for 2005-
2006 indicated over one-hundred million Americans sought medical attention for 
injuries resulting from accidents in 2003.  Approximately, 110,000 of these injuries 
resulted in death.  The total economic impact is estimated at $574.8 billion.  This 
figure pertains only to direct costs associated with injuries and does not include legal 
costs associated with such injuries.   Each injury invites and even necessitates the 
opportunity for individuals to determine causality and attribute responsibility or 
blame for such incidents.   
. In the legal setting, a growing concern is the influence of extralegal factors.  
The preceding analysis of responsibility highlighted a small selection of mediating 
factors which can influence the attribution of responsibility.  The listed examples 
primarily focused upon factors the individual consciously elaborates when 
apportioning responsibility.  However, there are a variety of factors which may 
influence the individual outside of the conscious effort to elaborate the key facts of an 
incident.  Contemporary literature has deemed these “extralegal factors.” 
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Over the past fifty years, an extensive amount of literature has been devoted to 
an examination of the impact of extralegal factors on the jury decision-making 
process.  Extralegal factors are those factors which lie outside the scope of what is 
deemed legally relevant to judgments of guilt and/or liability rendered in a particular 
case.  Legal relevance is dictated by, among other things, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, motions and limiting rulings by the judge and court-issued jury 
instructions.  Examples of extralegal factors include attorney presentation style 
(Barge, Schlueter, & Pritchard, 1989;  Hahn & Clayton, 1996;  Spiecker & 
Worthington, 2003), judge nonverbal communication (Badzinski, 1994), participant 
attractiveness (Izzett & Leginski, 1974; MacCoun, 1990), knowledge of outcomes 
(Casper, Benedict, & Perry, 1989;  Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995;  LaBine & LaBine, 
1996) and aggressiveness on the part of the attorney (Hahn & Clayton, 1996).  While 
legal theory presumes jurors are influenced only by those elements formally 
presented at trial, extensive research has shown extralegal factors that are present at 
trial, but not formally presented, can have a considerable influence upon the jury 
decision-making process.    
Extralegal factors have been a subject of great concern because of the active 
role they play in individual and group decision-making.  Our legal system has 
established a framework intended to reduce the influence of these “extraneous” 
issues.  This legal framework is applied in a variety of ways.  Attorney presentations 
at trial are dictated by the Federal Rules of Evidence (in federal courts), which filter 
and structure the information provided at trial.  Judges and attorneys attempt to 
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structure jury deliberations and verdicts by providing extensive jury instructions and 
lengthy verdict forms that often require juries to engage in an elaborate step-by-step 
process in order to reach a final verdict.  However, research has shown that such 
efforts often fail to exclude extra-legal factors from the judgment process (Kamin & 
Rachlinski, 1995; Stallard & Worthington, 1998). 
The failure to thwart the influence of extralegal factors can be attributed to a 
variety of issues.  A cursory review of the literature on this subject matter reveals a 
general lack of consistent empirical research identifying such factors.  Consequently, 
it becomes difficult to adopt measures to reduce the influence of extralegal factors 
when there is uncertainty as to what these factors are and how they are manifested. 
The purpose of the present study is to identify the strength and influence of 
two extralegal factors when attributing responsibility:  severity effects and personal 
choice.  Specifically, this research will test the assumption that the severity of injuries 
sustained in an accident functions as an extralegal factor in determinations of liability.  
Previous work has indicated significant differences in the role of severity effects 
across accident type (Bornstein, 1998;  Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor, & Hsieh, 1991).  This, 
in turn, has led to inconsistent data assessing the influence of severity effects.  
Consequently, it is more useful to examine the role of severity effects in particular 
legal contexts.   
Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor, and Hsieh (1991) argue that medical malpractice is a 
very distinct category of litigation when compared to other, more ordinary personal 
injury lawsuits involving automobile accidents and product liability.  They contend 
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that medical malpractice cases exist as distinct phenomena because, as opposed to 
incidents such as an automobile accident, medical malpractice cases involve a lesser 
degree of control over situational elements.  In instances of medical recommendations 
and/or procedures, because of the specialized knowledge required to make decision 
concerning these issues, victims are often at the mercy of the physicians to a much 
greater degree than the typical personal injury incident.   
Additionally, Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor, and Hsieh (1991) suggest that situational 
similarity may also at be at work in separating medical malpractice cases from other 
types of litigation such as automobile accidents.  Specifically, they argue that 
“because nearly everyone has at some point made a mistake behind the wheel, jurors 
plausibly also empathize more with defendant drivers than with defendant doctors” 
(p. 9). 
Finally, with an average of 1,200 medical malpractice claims appearing in 
state courts each year and average damage awards for plaintiffs just short of $500,000 
(Cohen, 2004), a renewed focus on the factors that influence these jury verdicts 
provides valuable data for those involved.  Identifying the influence of these two 
extralegal factors provides the groundwork for the development of strategies to cope 
with the influence of these factors at trial.  An understanding of the manner in which 
they operate can influence both plaintiff and defendant case strategies at trial.  This 
paper will conclude with recommendations for developing and implementing such 
strategies throughout the trial process. 
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Chapter Two will address the theoretical foundations of the current research.  
It will begin with an examination of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) as an 
explanation for the influence of extra-legal factors.  Specifically, Chapter Two will 
argue the complexities of litigation undermine the motivation and/or abilities of jurors 
to cognitively process information at trial using the central processing route.  Instead, 
jurors rely upon peripheral cognitive routes which favor the layperson’s notion of 
cause and responsibility over that established within the legal system by evidentiary 
rules and jury instructions among other things.  While these are not necessarily 
competing perspectives, the layperson’s notion of cause and responsibility introduces 
additional variables which may not be accounted for by current legal standards.  
Consequently, this gap allows for the influence of extra-legal factors.   
Following the discussion of ELM and peripheral processing, Chapter Two 
will introduce the human notion of cause as compared to that defined within in our 
legal system.  It will then address the relationship between cause and responsibility in 
order to establish how human notions of cause and responsibility allow for the 
influence of extra-legal factors.   
Finally, Chapter Two will address severity effects and electiveness as specific 
extra-legal factors which influence the attribution of responsibility within the context 
of medical malpractice and propose the research questions and hypotheses to be 
examined in this research.  Severity effects will be discussed followed by 
electiveness.  Prior research and findings on the influence of severity effects and 
electiveness will be analyzed.   
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CHAPTER TWO:  Literature Review 
Over the past fifty years, an extensive amount of literature has been devoted to 
an examination of the impact of extralegal factors on the jury decision-making 
process.  Examples cited previously include attorney presentation style (Barge, 
Schlueter, & Pritchard, 1989;  Hahn & Clayton, 1996;  Spiecker & Worthington, 
2003), judge nonverbal communication (Badzinski, 1994), participant attractiveness 
(Izzett & Leginski, 1974; MacCoun, 1990), knowledge of outcomes (Casper, 
Benedict, & Perry, 1989;  Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995;  LaBine & LaBine, 1996) and 
aggressiveness on the part of the attorney (Hahn & Clayton, 1996).  While legal 
theory presumes jurors are influenced only by those elements formally presented at 
trial, extensive research has shown extralegal factors that exist at trial, but not 
formally presented, can have a considerable influence upon the jury decision-making 
process.    
 
The Influence of Extra-legal Factors as a Function of Cognitive Route 
 
 
One possible explanation for the influence of extra-legal factors is provided 
by the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM).  ELM, originally developed by Petty 
and Cacioppo (1977; 1981; 1986a; 1986b), suggests there are two possible routes for 
cognitively processing information.  Each route affects the manner of change in one’s 
attitude towards a message.  The central route refers to a process “based on relatively 
extensive and effortful information processing activity aimed at scrutinizing and 
uncovering the central merits of the issue or advocacy” (Petty & Wegener, 1999).    
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This involves a primary focus on the substance of the actual message and the merits 
of that message.  On the other hand, the peripheral route refers to attitude changes 
“based on a variety of low effort attitude change processes” (Petty & Wegener, 1999).  
These involve focus on cues other than the message itself as a means to evaluate the 
message.  Examples of low effort attitude change processes include attitude changes 
resulting from the influence of source recognition, social desirability, message 
popularity or external rewards.  Researchers of ELM argue persuasion can occur 
using either the central or the peripheral route (Petty, 1977; Petty and Cacioppo, 
1981; 1986a; 1986b).  
 At the heart of ELM, lies the issue of motivating factors for cognitive 
processing routes.  Researchers (Petty, 1977; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; 1986a; 
1986b; Petty & Wegener, 1999) of ELM contend the route through which information 
is processed by an individual is largely determined by the individual’s motivation 
and/or ability to process the message.  Within the setting of medical malpractice 
litigation, a juror’s motivation and/or ability to process messages put forth by counsel 
for each party can be influenced by a variety of factors. 
 
 Deference to the Peripheral Route 
 
 For a layperson, of which most juries are constituted, the nature of 
information surrounding questions of medical malpractice can seem complicated and 
highly technical.  Issues of liability, negligence, proximate cause, etc. tend to adopt 
legalistic standards and language which often make it difficult for the layperson to 
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immediately comprehend the issues in question.  Additionally, jurors must cope with 
and sort through complex medical explanations and terminology offered by 
competing expert witnesses.   
Research has shown the use of technical or complex language often lowers the 
message comprehension rate among an audience (Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953;  
Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991).  These findings are not surprising.  Intuitively, this 
research identifies an obvious problem:  as the obscurity/unfamiliarity of language 
increases, the ability to understand the message decreases.  Consequently, as message 
comprehension among an audience decreases, persuasion or attitude change that does 
occur is likely the product of an on over-reliance upon peripheral cues. 
Ratneshwar and Chaiken (1991) conducted a study with four conditions, 
producing results which corroborated the theory that message complexity can 
influence the cognitive route through which messages are evaluated.  In this study, 
conditions varied along the lines of message comprehensibility and source credibility.  
Results indicated when the message had low comprehensibility, participants tended to 
cite the source credibility as a primary reason for the acceptance of the message.  
When the message had high comprehensibility, the message itself was cited as a 
primary reason for the participants’ acceptance of the message.  Hafer, Reynolds, and 
Obertynski (1996) conducted a similar study and also found that external cues such as 
source credibility tend to have greater influence among participants when the 
complexity of the message is high.  
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 These findings are not surprising.  It is human nature to simplify complex 
information in such a way as to make it manageable and accessible for attitude 
formation and change.  In this instance, the message is simplified via reliance upon 
what is perceived as an authoritative source.    
When complex messages are introduced, an individual is likely to identify 
peripheral cues that aid him or her in determining the message validity.  This is a 
fundamental premise of many theories of legal communication involving 
responsibility attribution such as the story model (Pennington & Hastie, 1991; 
Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Bennett & Feldman, 1981), norm theory (Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986) and damage prototypes (Hart, Evans, Wissler, & Feehan, 1997; Greene 
and Bornstein, 2003). 
ELM establishes a connection between issues of message comprehensibility at 
trial and the influence of extralegal factors.  ELM proposes two routes by which 
messages are elaborated:  central or peripheral.  Low message comprehensibility 
increases the likelihood of peripheral message processing, creating the opportunity 
for jurors to be influenced by elements legal scholars argue are outside the scope of 
the issue in question.  In a trial setting, a juror who cognitively processes information 
using the central route engages the evidence put forth by each side and evaluates the 
evidence against the applicable laws as dictated by the court, the attorneys and the 
jury instructions.  This involves an extensive and effortful processing activity aimed 
at scrutinizing and uncovering the central merits of the case, in which the court-
defined standards of causation and liability structure the manner in which the juror 
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understands the case and renders judgment upon the case.  In this manner, the court 
defines the features of central route processing via the rules of evidence and jury 
instructions.  Consequently, extra-legal factors, as defined by the court, would lie 
outside the scope of the central processing route.   
Jurors influenced by extra-legal factors are more likely to process case-related 
information and render judgment using the peripheral route, which involves an over-
reliance upon information not germane to the court-defined decision-making process.  
This is not to say that jurors using the peripheral route ignore the evidence and court 
instructions entirely.  Instead, these jurors rely to a much greater extent on peripheral 
cues in order to form attitudes and beliefs about the case.  This process can occur on a 
conscious level or subconscious level.  Regardless, to argue a juror who relies on 
peripheral cues is “ignoring the law” would fail to account for that juror’s 
perspective.  Often, jurors who rely upon peripheral cues view their decision-making 
processes as quite rational. 
 
Reliance upon the Layperson’s Notion of Cause and Responsibility 
 
In the context of medical malpractice litigation, the peripheral route often 
privileges the layperson’s approach to elaborating causation over the court-defined 
standards.  Layperson attributions of causation often diverge from strict legal 
definitions defining the standards of such attribution.  This divergence has been the 
subject of extensive philosophical discussion.  Legal philosophers have often argued 
that legal conceptualizations of causal attribution rest upon the understandings of the 
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“ordinary person” (Lloyd-Bostock, 1979; Hart & Honore, 1961), meaning legal 
standards for attributing causal responsibility have roots within the fundamental 
understanding of cause and effect by the “person in the street.”  The legal perspective 
recognizes, however, the “ordinary person” is often mistaken or misdirected in 
judgments surrounding attributions of causal responsibility for reasons ranging from 
emotive to psychological.  Consequently, courts have adopted rigid definitions of 
causality for medical malpractice litigation.  Each approach to addressing causation 
implicates the manner in which case information is psychologically structured by the 
individual juror.   
An ontological approach to the human understanding of cause highlights 
reasons for the divergence between the manner in which the “ordinary person” 
attributes responsibility and the court-defined standards for such attribution.  A recent 
study by Kruschke and Fragassi (1996) examined the efficacy of combining two very 
important philosophical and psychological works on human understanding of 
causation as a means to explain the “ordinary person’s” approach to determining 
causation:  David Hume’s ontology of causation (1979) and Belgian psychologist 
Albert Michotte’s psychology of causation (1941, 1963).  A brief discussion of these 
two approaches provides a framework for explaining the divergence of the 
layperson’s attribution of responsibility from that preferred by the courts.    
Hume argued “impressions of causality are mere fabrications of a 
sophisticated mind” (Kruschke and Fragassi, p. 441), in which the individual observes 
a relationship between two objects but is unable to observe causality itself.  Hence, 
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the impression of causality arises out of the individual’s projection of a mental 
connection on to the physical objects- not from an inherent bond between the two 
objects.  As Kruschke and Fragassi explain, “a sentiment of feeling that events are 
necessarily connected arises during the observation of a succession of events- a 
feeling which is transferred to the events themselves” (p. 441).   
Hume (1739) argued this feeling is “engendered by constant conjuncture or 
regular sequence” and stems from learned knowledge of causal connections.  More 
importantly, Hume’s theory of human understanding of causation recognizes the 
implications of human thought imposed upon the external world.  Hume classified 
causation as type of “feeling.”  This reduction suggests attributions of causality are 
subject to the influences and constraints of our psyches including those that are 
emotive, impulsive, and reductive.  Consequently, these confounding influences 
create space for divergence in human understanding of causation. 
Michotte (1941, 1963), responding to Hume’s theory of causation, argued “the 
impression of causality is a spontaneous perceptual gestalt which is neither learned 
nor an interpretation via abstract knowledge of physical events,” in which the 
“essence of perceived causality is ampliation of motion” (Kruschke and Fragassi, p. 
443).   Michotte described ampliation as a transference.  Kruschke and Fragassi 
employ the example of a game of pool in order to explain ampliation.  As a cue-ball 
rolls across the table and strikes the eight-ball, the motion of the cue-ball is 
perceptually transferred to the eight-ball.  Michotte differs from Hume in that he 
believes humans possess an innate ability to identify or impose ampliation as opposed 
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Hume’s suggestion that it is a learned trait.  Michotte’s notion of ampliation is 
important because it identifies an inherent human ability to observe what Phares and 
Wilson (1972) refer to as a “structured connection” between two entities that allows 
an individual to draw conclusions regarding causality.   
Michotte’s notion of ampliation, in conjunction with Hume’s characterization 
of perceptions of cause as “feelings” stemming from learned knowledge demonstrates 
how the philosophical conceptualization of human perception of cause parallels the 
implicit legalistic or scientific conceptualizations while still incorporating the 
“irrational” element of human attribution.  In these instances, the individual is able to 
recognize a structured connection between two things.  The individual then imposes 
upon that structured connection “feelings” and “learned knowledge” that allows the 
individual to conclude a causal connection exists. 
The notion of “irrational” human attribution of responsibility is further 
addressed by Heider (1983).  Heider (1983) argued attributions of cause pose 
limitations when applied in a social environment due to the failure to account for the 
influence of the human psyche.  This limitation is indicated in Heider’s concern 
regarding the distinction between human perception of the physical world and human 
perception of the social world (Harvey, 1993).  Causality concerns an individual’s 
observation of the physical world while responsibility addresses the individual’s 
ability to make sense of that physical world.     
Heider (1983), in his dissertation Thing and Medium, focused on the 
importance of environmental conditions in making the perception of objects possible.  
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In his later works, Heider applied this focus to the perception of self and others.  
Heider believed humans possessed the ability to make causal inferences.  However, 
when drawing causal inferences in a social environment, an individual is inundated 
with sensory information.  Consequently, the individual looks for a means to organize 
and make sense of this information.  As a result, these causal inferences operate in 
conjunction with the individual’s perception of environmental and social conditions 
in allowing that individual to translate the identification of a cause into the attribution 
of responsibility (Harvey, 1993).  Examples of environmental and social conditions 
focus primarily upon interpersonal relationships.   
For example, in the instance of medical malpractice, the social understanding 
of what it means to be a “physician” imposes expectations and characteristics 
associated with that social role.  The same is true for social understandings of what it 
means to be a “patient.”  While conceptualizations of these roles are not static, they 
are temporally linked to our cultural understandings.  For instance, the past decade 
has witnessed a resurgence of focus on the importance of patient responsibility.  
Consequently, this may lead individuals to define the role of a “patient” in such a way 
that imposes greater responsibility on the patient to make informed choices. 
The following situation provides an example of how the theories of Hume, 
Michotte and Heider may work in conjunction as an individual attempts to attribute 
cause and responsibility to an incident within the medical setting. 
A healthy individual visits a physician to have a surgery performed.  During 
the course of the surgery an artery is ruptured and the individual bleeds to death.  
 28
Michotte would argue a layperson can recognize a natural “structured connection” 
between the actions of the physician and the outcome of the surgery.  The individual 
was healthy prior to the surgery, which isolates pre-surgery events as an unlikely 
cause of the rupture.  The physician, as the primary actor during the surgery, has a 
direct connection to the results of those actions, making him a more likely source of 
the problem.  Consequently, the physician intuitively becomes a natural target for 
attributions of causality.   
Additionally, several extra-legal factors may influence attributions of 
responsibility.  The fact that the incident happened immediately after the doctor 
began the surgery creates the opportunity for a post-hoc fallacy.  Knowledge of the 
severity of this particular outcome allows the trier of fact, with the privilege of 
hindsight, to conclude the physician should have been more careful in performing the 
surgery.  This hindsight bias may be magnified by the social expectations cast upon 
the role of the physician, such as claims that it is the physician’s responsibility to 
thoroughly review and analyze each possible complication throughout the course of 
the surgery. 
Furthermore, if during trial, the same physician exhibits characteristics of a 
clumsy or careless individual, the trier of fact, drawing upon his knowledge of the 
implications of being clumsy or careless, will generate stronger “feelings” in regards 
to the physician being a likely cause of the patient’s death.     
On the other hand, if the surgery was elective, the trier of fact may conclude, 
because the surgery was not required and the patient chose to have it anyway, the 
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patient took on risks for which he was responsible.  Regardless, this example 
highlights how extra-legal factors may produce strong feelings among jurors that 
correspondingly shape attitudes and opinions of the causal source.   
 
Injury Severity as an Extra-legal Factor 
 
In order to rectify the dilemma in which jurors draw upon extralegal factors in 
a determination of liability, our legal system has established a framework intended to 
reduce the influence of these extraneous issues.  This legal framework is applied in a 
variety of ways.  Attorney presentations at trial are limited by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (in Federal courts), which filter and structure the information provided at 
trial.  Judges and attorneys attempt to structure jury deliberations and verdicts by 
providing extensive jury instructions and lengthy verdict forms that often require 
juries to engage in an elaborate step-by-step process in order to reach a final verdict.  
However, research has shown that such efforts often fail to exclude extra-legal factors 
from the judgment process (Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995; Stallard & Worthington, 
1998). 
 One area in particular that has received some recent attention has to do with 
the influence of injury severity in personal injury lawsuits.  Research (Walster, 1966;  
Bornstein, 1998;  Feigenson, N.,  Park, J., & Salovey, P, 1997;  Phares & Wilson, 
1972;  Robbennolt, 2000) has shown there is a strong relationship between the 
severity of injuries sustained in an accident and the amount of responsibility one 
attributes to the parties involved in the accident.  Specifically, it has been found, as 
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the severity of injuries increases, so to does the amount of responsibility assigned to 
those involved in the incident (Walster, 1966).   
In some ways, the impact of severity effects is similar to the phenomenon 
known as hindsight bias.  Feigenson (2000) defines hindsight bias as “the tendency to 
overestimate the probability of a known outcome and the ability of decision makers to 
have foreseen it” (p. 62).  In examining the effects of hindsight bias, Fischhoff (1975) 
found the knowledge of a specific outcome in an incident led to an over-
determination of the likelihood such an outcome would occur in the first place.  
Hindsight bias becomes especially problematic in the legal setting where, as Kamin 
and Rachlinski (1995) have noted, jurors are essentially asked to make after the fact 
judgments about before the fact probabilities.  
The standard negligence case requires the presence of four elements:  (1) the 
defendant had a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the 
breach caused (4) injury or harm to the plaintiff.  The key element of this approach to 
a determination of negligence has to do with proving the defendant caused the injury 
as a result of a breach of his or her duty.  Knowledge of the actual outcome should 
have no bearing upon considerations as to whether or not the defendant breached 
industry standards.  However, numerous studies (Casper, Benedict, & Perry, 1989;  
Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995;  LaBine & LaBine, 1996) have shown this is simply not 
the case.  Instead, jurors tend to be impacted by specific knowledge of outcomes in an 
incident, thereby making it an extralegal factor. 
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  The similarities between hindsight bias and severity effects have to do with 
the fact that they are both dependent upon knowledge of the outcome when it comes 
to determinations of liability.  Whereas hindsight bias simply addresses the issue of 
whether or not knowledge of the outcome is present, studies of severity effects go a 
bit further in examining how knowledge of different possible outcomes can impact 
determinations of liability. 
 A variety of mediating factors have been proposed to account for the 
relationship between injury severity and judgments of liability.  In finding a 
significant positive relationship between the severity of injuries sustained in accidents 
and the amount of responsibility or blame associated with the victim, Walster (1966) 
suggested defensive attribution occurs.  Defensive attribution occurs when observers 
feel inclined to differentiate themselves from the victims of accidents, reasoning that, 
as injury severity increases, it becomes more and more unpleasant to acknowledge 
such accidents could also happen to the observer.  Consequently, observers will look 
for means by which they can associate blame with the victim, thereby, differentiating 
themselves from the victims of the accident.  This phenomenon is often referred to as 
“victim blaming.”  It functions as defensive mechanism, offering the observers a 
certain degree of comfort in knowing, because they are different from the victim in 
question, the same accident is unlikely to occur with them.   
 In a re-examination of Walster’s (1966) research, Shaver (1970a) tested the 
underlying assumptions of the theory of defensive attribution.  Shaver (1970a) argues 
a necessary prerequisite to blaming the victim is the belief in the possibility that this 
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kind of accident could occur to the perceiver.  The presence of this belief is premised 
upon two elements:  (1) situational similarities; and (2) personal similarities.  Shaver 
(1970a) devotes most of her focus to the element of personal similarity, emphasizing 
it as the primary element since defensive attribution principally involves 
differentiating oneself from the actor involved in an accident.  Implicit in the 
emphasis on personal similarities over situational similarities is the notion that 
questions of agency lie at the heart of any instance of defensive attribution.  This 
notion makes intuitive sense in the context of defensive attribution given one is likely 
to have greater control over personal attributes than situational attributes.  A focus on 
situational aspects would seem to inherently decrease the amount of personal control 
one has over the events for it places the individual at the mercy of the situation, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of chance occurrences.     
 Shaver (1970a) was unable to replicate Walster’s (1966) findings concerning 
the relationship between outcome severity and attribution of responsibility.  However, 
Shaver (1970a) did find there was a significant relationship between perceived 
personal similarity and attributions of responsibility.  Specifically, she found greater 
perceptions of similarity between the victim of the accident and the observer led the 
observer to be more lenient in terms of judgments of responsibility.  These findings 
are consistent with a theory of defensive attribution, suggesting when the observer is 
unable to differentiate him or herself from the victim of the accident, (s)he is less 
willing to attribute fault for the accident to the victim.   
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The reason for such an occurrence is explained by Vidmar and Crinklaw 
(1974, p. 114):  “People need to believe that serious accidents could never happen to 
them, or if they could, that no one would ever blame them for the consequences.”  
This would lead us to believe that, in instances where there are perceived similarities 
between the victim of an accident and the observer, the observer is more likely to 
attribute the fault to some one other than the victim.   
 Lerner (1965) proposed the Just World theory to explain why responsibility 
attribution increases as the severity of an injury mounts.  Andre and Velasquez (1990) 
explain the Just World Theory stating “people have a strong desire or need to believe 
that the world is an orderly, predictable, and just place, where people get what they 
deserve. Such a belief plays an important function in our lives since in order to plan 
our lives or achieve our goals we need to assume that our actions will have 
predictable consequences. Moreover, when we encounter evidence suggesting that the 
world is not just, we quickly act to restore justice by helping the victim or we 
persuade ourselves that no injustice has occurred.”   
 The psychological mechanism behind the Just World Theory influences the 
manner in which responsibility is assigned.  It highlights the need to clearly identify a 
source of harm as the severity of injury increases.  This may occur either by focusing 
on the actions of the victim and how they contributed to the injury or by focusing on 
external factors as independent causes of the injury.  Regardless of the focus, the need 
to assign responsibility lingers due to the psychological implications of accepting the 
randomness of such events. 
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 Another theory (Lupfer et al, 1985) has suggested there is simply an anti-
plaintiff bias at work as opposed to an issue of victim-blaming.  This, in part, can be 
explained by the fact that jurors tend to underestimate the extent to which the 
behavior of a trial’s participants is shaped and constrained by the roles that they play.  
Lupfer et al (1985) conducted a study which found, because of factors such as the 
aggressiveness and greater insistence which naturally exist in the presentations of the 
plaintiff due to the burden of proof, there exists an anti-plaintiff bias which ultimately 
leads to more verdicts in favor of the defendant.  Lupfer et al (1985) argue this occurs 
simply because jurors tend to attribute this aggressiveness and insistence to 
dispositional characteristics of the actual plaintiff.   
 An alternative explanation has been suggested by Bornstein (1998).  Bornstein 
found that, contrary to the theories proposed by Walster (1966) and Lupfer et al 
(1985), there is a greater tendency to find for the victim as injury severity increases in 
legal disputes involving personal injuries.  In order to explain this relationship, 
Bornstein draws upon general psychological theories of emotional responses to 
suffering.  Research (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987) has indicated humans tend 
to respond to the suffering and/or emotional distress of others with a desire to help 
them.  In the legal context, this translates into a desire among jurors to find for the 
victim, regardless of knowledge of the circumstances that led to the injury. 
 In his research, Bornstein links jurors’ knowledge of injury severity to a desire 
to help the victim by drawing upon a theory of action readiness (Frijda, 1987;  Frijda, 
Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989).  Frijda et al (1989) argue action readiness is an 
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essential element of this process because it is what links experience to behavior.  
Here, the experience of emotional distress and/or suffering is important only to the 
extent of how it impacts the individual observer.  A theory of action readiness 
suggests various emotional responses are linked to corresponding behaviors.  For 
example, the emotion of fear tends to lead to the behavior of avoidance of the 
stimulus leading to fear.  In the context of injury severity, the observer’s emotional 
response is linked to a desire to take action that helps the victim.   
 Bornstein highlights the importance of action readiness by suggesting its 
implications for scenarios in which a relationship between injury severity and 
responsibility attribution may exist.  Specifically, he argues the tendency to find for 
the victims of accidents will only occur in instances in which the juror has the ability 
to award damages.  In legal disputes involving claims of personal injury, the only way 
in which jurors can “help” the victim is by awarding damages.  Without this capacity, 
the inability to act upon the observation of emotional distress and/or suffering will 
counteract a desire to find for the victim.  Therefore, Bornstein adopts a research 
design that accounts for conditions in which the jurors may or may not have the 
ability to award damages.  The results supported the theory that the positive 
relationship between injury severity and responsibility attribution is mediated by the 
jurors’ ability to award damages.    
 Shaver (1970b) offers further support for this theory, arguing it is a product of 
the Western legal tradition to clarify responsibility for an incident in order to resolve 
the situation by awarding compensation and assigning punishment.  This theory 
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argues against that of Walster’s (1966) claiming it is not the need to defend against 
the idea that such an incident could happen to the observer that leads to greater 
attribution of responsibility.  Instead, it is simply the need to move towards 
resolution. 
 Each of the previous theoretical discussions has offered its own valuable 
insights regarding the nature of the relationship between the severity of injuries 
sustained in an accident and attributions of responsibility.  Unfortunately, findings 
across the literature have been largely inconsistent.  In contrast to the statistically 
significant findings of the research identified so far (Walster, 1966;  Bornstein, 1998;  
Feigenson, N.,  Park, J., & Salovey, P, 1997;  Phares & Wilson, 1972;  Robbennolt, 
2000), other research has found no such relationship (Cather, Greene, & Durham, 
1996; Green, 1968; Shaver, 1970a; Shaw & McMartin, 1977; Thomas & Parpal, 
1987).  Even later research by Walster (1967) failed to replicate the findings of her 
original study.     
 There have been many attempts to explain the disparities in findings across 
these studies.  Robbennolt (2000) suggests one area of concern lies in the 
operationalization of “responsibility.” In an examination of responsibility attribution, 
Heider (1958) identified five levels of responsibility:  (1) association, where a simple 
connection to the incident is all that is required; (2) causality, where it is shown that 
the individual being blaming was the necessary precondition for the incident; (3) 
foreseeability, which suggests that the individual being blamed could have anticipated 
the outcome; (4) intention on the part of the individual being blamed and; (5) 
 37
justification, which leads to attributions of less responsibility because of 
environmental factors that may have led to the incident. 
 Robbennolt (2000), in conducting a meta-analysis of the literature that has 
been published in the area of severity effects, concludes several studies have adopted 
varying approaches to understanding responsibility, consequently, leading to varying 
results.  Bornstein (1998) further supports this indictment suggesting responsibility, 
while related to the legal concept of liability, is not the same as liability.  For 
example, many liability and negligence lawsuits incorporate the element of industry 
standards or standard of care in determinations of liability.  These elements are 
legally relevant but not common to everyday attributions of responsibility for 
accidents outside of the legal setting. 
 In addition to definitions of responsibility, Bornstein (1998) suggests the 
presence and/or strength of severity effects tends to vary across different types of 
legal cases.  Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor, and Hsieh (1991) further support this view in their 
analysis of differences between “deep pocket” cases such as medical malpractice and 
ordinary personal injury lawsuits such as automobile accidents.  This could be 
explained in part by the element of situational similarity mentioned in Shaver’s 
(1970a) breakdown of the belief in the possibility that the injury/accident could occur 
to the observer.  Some accidents are more situationally similar to those the jurors find 
themselves in, leading to inconsistent degrees of the outcome severity/responsibility 
attribution relationship. 
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Finally, studies by Shaw and Sulzer (1964) suggest responsibility attribution 
as related to injury severity may be mediated by the ambiguities surrounding the 
“structured connection” between the individual and the incident.  This theory argues 
it is easier for individuals to attribute greater responsibility as injury severity amounts 
in situations where there is a clear connection between the individual and the incident.  
On the other hand, it is natural for individuals to be hesitant in assigning blame in 
situations where there is doubt as to whether or not the individual can be linked to the 
incident.       
 The purpose of the present study is to test the theory that the severity of 
injuries sustained in an accident will function as an extralegal factor in determinations 
of liability.  Previous works indicate differences in the role of severity effects across 
accident type (Bornstein, 1998; Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor, & Hsieh, 1991).  This may 
explain the presence of such mediating factors as anti-plaintiff bias, victim-blaming, 
and victim-defense.  Consequently, it is more useful to examine the role of severity 
effects in particular legal contexts.  Specifically, this study will look at the role of 
severity effects in medical malpractice litigation and attempt to resolve many of the 
competing perspectives of how the relationship between injury severity and 
responsibility attribution functions.  In doing so, it will pose two research questions: 
 
Research Question #1:  What is the relationship between the severity of injuries 
sustained by a patient during a medical procedure and the degree of responsibility 
attributed to the physician? 
 
Research Question #2:  What is the relationship between the “electiveness” of the 
medical procedure and the degree of responsibility attributed to the physician for 
injuries sustained by the patient during the medical procedure? 
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Electiveness as an Extra-legal factor 
 
Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor, and Hsieh (1991) argue that medical malpractice is a 
very distinct category of litigation when compared to other, more ordinary personal 
injury lawsuits involving automobile accidents and product liability.  This difference 
is premised upon two factors:  (1) the victim’s control over the situation and (2) 
situational similarity.    
Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor, and Hsieh (1991) contend that medical malpractice 
cases exist as distinct phenomena because, as opposed to incidents such as an 
automobile accident, medical malpractice cases involve a lesser degree of control 
over situational elements.  In instances of medical recommendations and/or 
procedures, because of the specialized knowledge required to make decision 
concerning these issues, victims are at the mercy of the physicians to a much greater 
degree than the typical personal injury incident.  Consequently, adopting this 
viewpoint, one would be led to the conclusion, that jurors are more likely to find 
physicians liable as the severity of the injuries sustained increases.   
 In addition to the element of the victim’s control over the situation, Bovbjerg, 
Sloan, Dor, and Hsieh (1991) suggest that situational similarity may also at be at 
work in separating medical malpractice cases from other types of litigation such as 
automobile accidents.  Specifically, they argue that “because nearly everyone has 
himself at some point made a mistake behind the wheel, jurors plausibly also 
empathize more with defendant drivers than with defendant doctors” (1991, p. 33).  
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This would be consistent with Shaver’s (1970a) analysis because, once the shift of 
focus to the physician occurs, the observer is likely to perceive lesser degrees of 
similarity between him or herself and the physician in question.  If we accept the 
assumptions of the Just World Theory, this differentiation would then allow the 
observer or juror to attribute greater responsibility for the injuries to the physician.    
 Furthermore, numerous studies have shown that the quality of care alone is a 
poor predictor of the likelihood of medical malpractice lawsuits (Bernstein, 1987; 
Herbert, 1986; Brennan, Leape, Laird, et al, 1991; Localio, Lawthers, Brennan et al, 
1991).  These startling revelations heighten the need to examine the influence of 
extralegal factors within the context of medical setting so that we may begin to 
understand the factors that shape perceptions of medical malpractice.   
Drawing upon previous studies, this research will test two hypotheses: 
H1:  As the severity of injuries sustained by a patient in a medical procedure 
increases, the amount of responsibility for the injuries attributed to the physician will 
also increase. 
 
H2:  The degree of responsibility for the injuries sustained by a patient during a 
medical procedure that is attributed to the physician will be significantly lower in 
instances where the medical procedure is perceived as “elective.” 
 
Responsibility will be defined by the standards most commonly used in 
contemporary lawsuits involving claims of medical malpractice.  Specifically, 
medical malpractice litigation draws upon the concept of negligence.  Boumil and 
Elias (1995) indicate that negligence is composed of four elements:  (1) the actor 
owes a duty of care to another; (2) the applicable standard for carrying out the duty is 
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breached; (3) the breach of duty causes a compensable injury; and (4) there are 
compensable damages or injuries to the plaintiff.   
 Adopting this conceptualization of negligence, the duty is established by the 
nature of the professional relationship.  In the instance of medical malpractice, the 
physician has a duty because of his or her role as the patient’s caregiver.  Boumil and 
Elias (1995) indicate that the standard of care clause is “based upon what a 
‘reasonable practitioner’ would do in like circumstances.  The standard is not one of 
excellence or superior practice; it only requires that the physician exercise that degree 
of skill and care that would be expected of the average qualified practitioner” (p. 24-
25). 
 Finally, the actions of the defendant must be causally related to the harms or 
injuries identified by the plaintiff.  Here, Boumil and Elias (1995) isolate two 
standards for determining causation:  cause-in-fact and proximate cause.  Cause-in-
fact is explained as instances in which the “injury to the plaintiff would not have 
occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s wrongful act, or if injury to the plaintiff was a 
foreseeable result of the defendant’s act” (1995, p. 116).  Proximate cause, on the 
other hand, refers to, taking all issues into consideration, whether or not the actions of 
the defendant have some causal connection to the injuries sustained by the plaintiff.  
Here, the actions of the defendant may not be the only cause.  However, it is clearly 




CHAPTER THREE:  Methodology 
 
Overview of study 
 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the influence of injury severity and 
the electiveness of a medical procedure on the apportionment of responsibility 
attributed to the physician and patient in instances of medical malpractice.  
Consequently, this study adopted a 2X2 research design.  Conditions varied based 
upon injury severity and the electiveness of the medical procedure.   
 The premise of each scenario involved an individual who had an abnormal 
growth behind his ear which was identified by physicians as a benign tumor.  In each 
scenario, a medical procedure was performed to remove the tumor.  During the course 
of the surgery, the physician improperly implanted a needle used to administer a local 
anesthetic into the upper portion of the patient’s neck and cheek area.  This resulted in 
irreversible damage to the patient’s facial nerve. 
The injury severity condition contained a low severity condition, in which the 
patient suffered a slight facial distortion, which becomes apparent to others only 
when he smiles and a high severity condition, in which the patient suffered a facial 
distortion that causes his face to droop on one side which gives him the appearance of 
having a deformation.  In the high severity condition, the patient believes the 
deformity radically alters his appearance to others in a very negative way, which has 
caused him to lose many friends (including his fiancé) and feel alienated in public. 
 The elective conditions contained a non-elective procedure, in which the 
patient had to undergo the surgery in order to prevent permanent hearing loss and 
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severe, acute pain throughout the left side of his face, and; an elective procedure, in 
which the procedure was not medically necessary.  In other words, the presence of the 
tumor posed no medical danger to the patient.  In each of the elective scenarios, the 
patient chose to undergo surgery for cosmetic reasons.  Specifically, he felt the 
presence of the tumor negatively impacted his appearance to others.    
The severity and electiveness conditions produced four scenarios:  elective-
serious, elective-minor, non-elective-serious, non-elective-minor. 
 
Procedure 
Participants in each of the conditions received a booklet containing a 
randomly-assigned scenario involving an incident of medical malpractice.  Each 
scenario consisted of approximately two pages in length.  After reading about the 
incident, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire addressing their 
reactions to the incident.  This questionnaire provided participants with three options:  
assign a percentage of responsibility to the patient, assign a percentage of 
responsibility to the physician or indicate “no one was responsible.”   Following each 
option, participants were asked to explain why responsibility was apportioned in that 
manner.   
In addition to the assignment of responsibility, participants were asked to rate 
the severity of the injuries sustained by the patient using a seven-point Likert scale.  
A similar scale was used to assess participant perceptions of the electiveness of the 
surgery.   
 44
Participants responded to a series of questions addressing attitudes and 
experiences associated with instances of medical malpractice.  The purpose of these 
sections was to identify potential confounding variables which may have influenced 
the manner in which responsibility was assigned.  First, participants’ experiences with 
their own physicians were assessed.  The purpose of this section was to test for the 
influence of participants’ personal experiences with physicians and if such 
experiences influenced the manner in which responsibility is apportioned in scenarios 
used in this research. 
  Participants were asked to indicate if they were currently seeing a physician 
for an ongoing health condition.  Additionally, they were asked if they have a 
physician they see regularly or prefer to see for health related issues.  Finally, the 
Patient-Doctor Interaction Scale (Smith, 1983; Bowman, Herndon, Sharp, & Dignan, 
1992) was adopted to assess participants’ perceptions of their relationship, 
communication, and experiences with their own physicians. 
In addition to participants’ personal experiences with health care, participants’ 
attitudes towards health care in general were assessed.  Participants were asked a 
variety of questions intended to reveal their attitudes towards the quality of health 
care in our country.  These included questions such as “how would you rate the 
quality of care provided by our nation’s healthcare system” and “do you think the 
quality of care provided by our nation’s healthcare system has gotten better, worse or 
stayed the same in the past five years.”   
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Finally, participants’ attitudes towards the legal system were assessed.  This 
included questions such as “what percentage of medical malpractice lawsuits do you 
think are justified,” do you believe there are far too many frivolous lawsuits today,” 
and “do you believe people these days are always trying to blame others for their 
misfortune.”  The purpose of these questions was to examine what influence, if any, 
participants’ attitudes towards the legal system influenced the manner in which they 
assigned responsibility in the scenarios.   
 
Materials 
The fact pattern used for this study was derived from that used in earlier 
studies conducted by Feigenson, Park and Salovey (1997) and Vidmar et al (1994), 
which involved a scenario in which a patient was found to have developed a cyst 
behind his ear.  For the purpose of this research, Feigenson, Park and Saloveys’ basic 
scenario was altered to reflect a fact pattern more consistent with the type a jury 
might hear in the courtroom.  The original scenario provided very little detail.  
Changes included the addition of a detailed description of the problem (the cyst was 
changed to a tumor in this research) and the corresponding implications.  A 
description of the patient’s relationship and communication with the physician was 
provided.  Finally, greater detail regarding the resulting injuries was provided.  Each 
of the scenarios can be found in appendixes A (elective-serious), B (elective-minor), 
C (non-elective-serious), and D (non-elective-minor). 
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 The materials provided to participants indicated that their determinations 
should only be concerned with attribution of responsibility and would have no 
bearing upon any form of compensation the patient may or may not receive.   
The Patient-Doctor Interaction Scale (Smith, 1983; Bowman, Herndon, Sharp, 
& Dignan, 1992) was included in each questionnaire in order to assess participants’ 
personal health care experiences.   
Additionally, the questionnaire contained sections pertaining to the 
participants’ attitudes towards the legal system and health care in general.  These 
questions were adopted from the Tsongas Litigation Consulting, Inc. 1993 Northwest 
Juror Attitude Research project.   
The complete questionnaire is provided in Appendix E. 
Participants 
One hundred and eleven undergraduate students from the University of 
Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, participated in this study during the 2006 summer 
sessions.  Students participating in the research received course credit for COMS 130:  
Speaker-Audience Communication.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four conditions:  elective-serious, elective-minor, non-elective-serious, non-elective-




Fifty-seven undergraduate students from the University of Kansas, Lawrence, 
Kansas, participated in this study during the 2006 summer sessions.  Participants were 
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randomly assigned to one of four conditions:  elective-serious, elective-minor, non-
elective-serious, non-elective-minor.   
The data were used to assess the validity of each of the conditions.  
Conditions A and C constituted the severe injury condition while groups B and D 
constituted the minor injury category.  Conditions A and C contained a total of 
twenty-nine participants while conditions B and D contained a total of twenty B 
participants.   
In each of the four conditions, participants were asked to assign a value on a 
Likert scale between one and seven for injury severity.  One indicated low severity 
and seven indicated high severity.  The mean score for conditions A and C was 5.79.  
The lowest value assigned in these conditions was four.  The means score for 
conditions B and D was 4.36.  The lowest value assigned in these conditions was one.  
Statistical comparisons between conditions A and C and conditions B and D (using 
Student’s T) produced a test statistic of 4.08, which produced a P-value close to 0.  
Additionally, conditions B and D appear to have a fairly normal distribution while 
conditions A and C have an asymmetrical distribution weighted towards the upper 
end of scoring choices.  Finally, the standard deviation for conditions B and D is over 
one-half of a point higher than the standard deviation for conditions A and C. 
In the pilot study, conditions A and B constituted the elective surgery 
condition while conditions C and D constituted the non-elective surgery category.  In 
each of the four conditions, participants were asked to assign a value between one and 
seven indicating the degree to which he/she believed the surgery to be elective or 
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non-elective.  One indicated non-elective and seven indicated elective.  The mean 
score for conditions A and B was 6.  The means score for conditions C and D was 
2.03.  Statistical comparisons between conditions A and B and conditions C and D 
(using Student’s T) produced a test statistic of 11.4, which produces a P-value close 
to 0. 
In sum, the experimental variation of the conditions proved to be successful.  

















CHAPTER FOUR:  Results 
Four conditions were examined in this study.  Condition A represented the 
high severity, elective condition.  Condition B represented the low severity, elective 
condition.  Condition C represented the high severity, non-elective condition.  
Condition D represented the low severity, non-elective condition.  A total of one-
hundred and eleven participants provided questionnaire responses.   
 
Reliability of the conditions 
 
 Descriptive statistics and one-way ANOVA supported pilot study findings 
regarding differences in respondents’ perceptions of elective and non-elective 
surgery.  Respondents were asked to rate the extent of the electiveness of the 
procedure on a seven-point Likert Scale.  Low scores indicated non-elective and 
higher scores indicated elective.  The mean score for respondents’ perception of 
electiveness in the non-elective conditions was 2.55.  The elective conditions 
produced a mean score of 6.2.    Group comparisons confirmed statistically 
significant differences in perceptions of electiveness between groups (F=146.43, 
p=.00).  
 Additionally, descriptive statistics and one-way ANOVA supported pilot 
study findings regarding differences in respondents’ perceptions of the high and low 
severity conditions.  Respondents were asked to rate the extent of the severity of the 
injury sustained on a seven-point Likert Scale.  Low scores indicated low severity and 
higher scores indicated high severity.  The mean score for the low severity condition 
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was 4.2, while the mean score for the high severity condition was 5.88.  Group 
comparisons confirmed statistically significant differences in perceptions of injury 
severity between groups (F=42.66, p=.00).  Additionally, the minimum severity rating 
assigned by a respondent in the low severity condition was 1 while the minimum 
severity rating assigned by a respondent in the high severity condition was 3.   
 
Results 
The descriptive statistics for each of the conditions are provided in table 1.  
“Joe” and “Davis” refer to the amount of responsibility assigned to each respectively.  
“Severity” refers to the participant perceptions of severity based upon a seven-point 
Likert scale.  “Elective” refers to the participant perceptions of the “electiveness” of 
the surgery based upon a seven-point Likert scale.   
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics for each condition (Joe=patient; Davis=physician) 
27.71 65.14 5.86 6.54
28 28 28 28
26.853 31.597 1.079 .744
27.96 64.63 4.22 5.85
27 27 27 27
26.358 31.253 1.672 1.680
16.11 76.75 5.82 2.64
28 28 28 28
17.413 27.430 1.249 1.850
17.68 71.61 4.18 2.46
28 28 28 28
22.709 33.390 1.442 1.795
22.32 69.58 5.03 4.36
111 111 111 111



























Table 2 identifies the number of participants in each condition who selected 
“no one was responsible.” 
 
Table 2:  Number of participants in each condition who selected “no one was 
responsible” 
 






 The distribution of respondents who indicated “no one was responsible” 
among each of the conditions did not reveal any patterns or significant differences 
between conditions based upon this response.  Consequently, for the remaining 
analysis, the data provided by these respondents were excluded.  The descriptive 
statistics excluding data from participants who indicated “no one was responsible” are 










Table 3:  Descriptive statistics for each condition excluding data from 
respondents who selected “no one was responsible” 
 
29.85 70.15 5.81 6.50
26 26 26 26
26.695 26.695 1.096 .762
30.20 69.80 4.24 5.76
25 25 25 25
26.120 26.120 1.739 1.715
17.35 82.65 5.77 2.77
26 26 26 26
17.468 17.468 1.275 1.861
19.80 80.20 4.32 2.56
25 25 25 25
23.161 23.161 1.464 1.850
24.28 75.72 5.05 4.40
102 102 102 102






















Joe Davis Severity Elective
 
 
 Table 4 shows the tests of between subject effects upon the responsibility 
attributed by participants to Dr. Davis.  The results indicate a significant effect for the 
elective conditions (p = .016) and a lack of significance for the severity conditions (p 
= .765).  Finally, the results indicate a lack of significant interaction between the 









Table 4:  Tests of between-subject effects  
Dependent Variable: Davis
3433.486a 3 1144.495 2.051 .112 .059
584314.942 1 584314.942 1047.020 .000 .914
3341.828 1 3341.828 5.988 .016 .058
50.236 1 50.236 .090 .765 .001














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Partial Eta
Squared
R Squared = .059 (Adjusted R Squared = .030)a. 
 
 
Hypothesis one predicted the amount of responsibility attributed to the 
physician would increase as the severity of injuries sustained in a medical procedure 
increased.  The data did not support this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis two predicted the degree of responsibility for the injuries sustained 
in the medical procedure that was attributed to the physician would be significantly 
lower in instances where the medical procedure was perceived as “elective.”  The 
data supported hypothesis two. 
Additional analysis was conducted to examine the nature of the relationship 
between the predictor in hypothesis two (electiveness) and the responsibility 
attributed to Dr. Davis.  In addition to the categorical data based upon the four 
conditions in this research, participant perceptions of electiveness were examined as a 
second-level predictor of responsibility attribution.  Both the conditions and 
perceptions of the electiveness within the conditions were regressed against the 
responsibility attributed to Dr. Davis by entering the variables into the regression 
equation sequentially as block effects.  The categorical data was entered first and 
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participant perceptions of the electiveness were entered second.  Tables 5 shows the 
model summary for the regression analysis measuring participant perceptions of 
electiveness as a sequential block effect. 
 
Table 5:  Model summary for regression analysis using perceptions of 
electiveness as sequential block effects including beta coefficients 
Model Summary
.240a .058 .048 23.403 .058 6.126 1 100 .015










Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: Condition (Elective)a. 




81.451 3.277 24.855 .000
-11.471 4.634 -.240 -2.475 .015
85.748 5.057 16.955 .000
-5.878 6.827 -.123 -.861 .391





















 Table 5 shows the R-square value increased from the initial value (.058) as the 
second-level predictor, participant perceptions of electiveness, was added to the 
model (.069).  However, the R-square change values indicate the addition of the 
second block of variables did not significantly increase the amount of variance 
captured by the regression equation.  Consequently, there is no statistical support for 
the conclusion that participant perceptions of electiveness function as a better 
predictor of responsibility attribution than the categorical data. 
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 Despite the weakness of the models as predictors, the ANOVA results 
indicated each model was statistically significant in predicting the amount of 
responsibility attributed to Dr. Davis.  The first model, for the categorical data, 
produced a p-value of .015.  The second model, which added the element of 
participant perceptions of electiveness, produced a p-value of .028.  Table 6 shows 
the results of this ANOVA procedure. 
 
Table 6:  ANOVA results for regression analysis 
ANOVAc
3355.147 1 3355.147 6.126 .015a
54769.608 100 547.696
58124.755 101













Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Condition (Elective)a. 
Predictors: (Constant), Condition (Elective), Perception of electivenessb. 
Dependent Variable: Davisc. 
 
  
 Finally, the standardized correlation coefficients for the linear regression 
models identified electiveness as a significant predictor of the variance in the 





Sympathy:  Tests for between-subject effects were conducted to examine the 
relationship between participant sympathy for Dr. Davis and the amount of 
responsibility attributed to him for the injuries sustained by the patient.  Table 7 
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displays the results.  No interaction was found between participant sympathy for Dr. 
Davis and the injury severity or electiveness conditions.   
Table 7:  Tests of between-subject effects-Sympathy for Joe  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
9395.832a 13 722.756 1.305 .225
143432.718 1 143432.718 259.026 .000
4690.733 1 4690.733 8.471 .005
5389.382 8 673.673 1.217 .299















of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Table 8:  Tests of between-subject effects-Sympathy for Davis 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
12801.285a 13 984.714 1.912 .039
330456.731 1 330456.731 641.614 .000
241.351 1 241.351 .469 .495
6932.091 6 1155.348 2.243 .046















of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.








 Legal Attitudes:  None of the general legal attitudes assessed in the survey 
were found to be related to respondents’ attribution of responsibility.  The results for 
legal attitudes are provided in appendix F. 
 
 Attitudes towards medical malpractice:  On the issue of attitudes pertaining to 
medical malpractice litigation, regression analysis revealed a statistically significant 
relationship between the percentage of responsibility assigned to Dr. Davis and 
perceptions of whether or not most medical malpractice lawsuits are justified.  
Specifically, respondents’ who believe most medical malpractice lawsuits today are 
justified tended to assign greater responsibility to Dr. Davis. 
 
 Additional data:  There were no other statistically significant relationships 
observed in the data.  However, a full statistical report has been provided in appendix 









CHAPTER FIVE:  Discussion 
 The goal of this research was to identify factors that influence the manner in 
which responsibility is attributed in instances of medical malpractice.  The results 
highlight the role extra-legal factors play in the decision-making process, which can 
inform the trial strategy of both plaintiffs and defendants in medical malpractice 
litigation. 
 An overarching result of this research is further indirect support for the claim 
that, while jurors are influenced by extra-legal factors, it is the evidence which 
primarily determines the verdict (Devine, Clayton, et al, 2001; Visher, 1987).  In 
other words, extra-legal factors such as electiveness can influence the attribution of 
responsibility in instances of medical malpractice.  However, it is not the primary 
determinant of the attribution of responsibility.  This was indicated by the low R-
square and partial eta squared values associated with each of the relationships.  In 
light of this finding, the greater value of this research may lie in its contribution to the 
formulation of strategies in medical malpractice litigation to minimize damages 
through either apportionment or actual damage amounts. 
 
Severity and Responsibility 
 
 
 The data failed to support hypothesis one, which postulated a significant 
relationship between the severity of injuries sustained in a medical procedure and the 
degree of responsibility attributed to the physician involved and suggested the amount 
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of responsibility attributed to the physician would increase as the severity of injuries 
sustained in a medical procedure increased.   
As indicated in Chapter Two, prior research has proven inconclusive with 
regards to the influence of injury severity on determinations of responsibility of the 
parties involved in an incident.  Robbennolt (2000) has attributed the disparities in 
findings across the research to the operationalization of “responsibility.”  In 
explaining to respondents the meaning of the term “responsibility,” this research 
adopted a standard legal definition of the term, which stated:   
“In the legal setting, responsibility is assigned to physicians based upon the 
following criteria:  (1) the physician owed a duty of care to another, which is 
established once the physician agrees to provide care for the patient; (2) the 
physician violated the standard of care that should be expected in such 
procedures; and (3 & 4) the violation of the standard of care caused the 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff.  A physician who holds him/herself out to 
be a specialist in a particular field of medicine has a duty to use his/her skill 
and knowledge as a specialist in a manner consistent with the special degree 
of skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by other specialists in the same 
field of expertise at the time of the diagnosis and/or treatment.  A violation of 
this duty is negligence.  You may also decide that the patient bears 
responsibility for the injuries sustained during the procedure.” 
 
 The respondents in this study were provided no additional jury instructions on 
this matter.  In light of Robbennolt’s (2000) observation that several studies on 
severity effects have adopted varying approaches to understanding responsibility, 
which has, consequently, led to varying results, future research should specifically 
address the effect of the verdict form and jury instructions in determinations of 
responsibility where injury severity varies, especially in light of Bornstein’s 
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observation that there is a conceptual difference between the layperson’s 
understanding of the term “responsibility” and that of “liability.” 
 An alternative explanation for the lack of statistical significance regarding the 
relationship between injury severity and responsibility attribution may relate to the 
issue of participant sympathy.  While this research measured participant sympathy for 
both the patient and the physician, it failed to account for the impact of live testimony 
from the patient or physician.  Consequently, participants may have found it difficult 
to feel sympathy for either the patient or the physician in the absence of live 
testimony, where each would have had the opportunity to present his corresponding 
narrative.   
As noted in Chapter two, prior research (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987) 
has indicated humans tend to respond to the suffering and/or emotional distress of 
others with a desire to help them.  Bornstein (1998) referred to this as “action 
readiness.”  In the absence of live testimony from either the patient or the physician, 
participants may have found it difficult to understand or internalize the suffering 
and/or emotional distress of either party.   Sometimes humans need to see that 
someone else is suffering as opposed to hearing about it.  In other words, the visual 
image alone can mediate sympathy.  Consequently, the presence of testimony from 
either party presents an avenue for future research on severity effects.  
 Finally, Bornstein (1998) argued the presence and/or strength of severity 
effects varies across different types of legal cases.  The literature review in Chapter 
Two was unable to identify any other research which has focused specifically upon 
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the influence of severity effects within the context of alleged medical malpractice.  
Consequently, more research in the area of medical malpractice needs to be 
conducted in order to examine the influence of varying factors including as those 
previously mentioned (verdict form, jury instructions, live testimony, etc) in this 
discussion section. 
 
Electiveness and Responsibility 
 
 
The data supported hypothesis two which claimed the degree of responsibility 
for the injuries sustained in a medical procedure that is attributed to the physician 
would be significantly lower in instances where the patient had some perceived 
control over the procedure.    Specifically, as participants’ perceptions of the 
electiveness of the procedure increased, the amount of responsibility attributed to Dr. 
Davis decreased.  Instead, in instances where the procedure was perceived as elective, 
the participants indicated Joe should shoulder some of the responsibility for the 
resulting injuries. 
While Joe’s choice did not influence the manner in which Dr. Davis 
performed the surgery nor did it lead Dr. Davis to improperly implant the needle, the 
data indicated participants still felt Joe should shoulder some of the responsibility for 
his choice to undergo an operation that was not deemed a medical necessity.  This is 
especially interesting in light of the fact that each scenario involved an admission by 
Dr. Davis that he did improperly implant the needle, which was the cause of the 
injuries to the Joe.   
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The increased responsibility assigned to Joe within the elective conditions 
may have been the product of counterfactual thinking.  Feigenson (2000) described 
counterfactual thinking as instances when “people trying to identify the cause or 
causes of some outcome imagine (or simulate) scenarios other than the one that 
actually occurred by ‘undoing’ or ‘mutating’ one or more of the events that preceded 
the outcome.  They imagine:  ‘if only x had been different, the outcome would have 
been different.’”  Feigenson (2000) noted the more readily identifiable the alternative 
scenario is, the more likely people will focus on the varying factor when attributing 
responsibility. 
In this study, the decision to undergo an “unnecessary” surgery is an easily 
identifiable focal point for counterfactual thinking.  First, it is one of the few, if not 
only factors, of which participants, armed from knowledge and personal experience, 
could argue as something that could or should have been different.  In other words, it 
is difficult to focus on the choice of doctor, the type of procedure used, etc. simply 
due to a lack of detailed information regarding these factors.  Second, participants 
may have found it difficult to relate to a decision to undergo an “unnecessary” 
medical procedure.  Despite recent cosmetic trends, most individuals may not have 
had a personal experience in which they had a reason to undergo an unnecessary 
medical procedure.  Consequently, it may have been difficult for participants to 
understand why an individual would do such a thing.  Combined with the hindsight 
bias associated with the knowledge of the injury, it is easy to conclude the risks will 
always outweigh the benefits of an unnecessary procedure. 
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 The research findings pertaining to the influence of electiveness create a 
dilemma for patients involved in litigation resulting from an injury suffered during 
the course of a surgery.  This research demonstrates a defendant’s success in 
identifying a connection between the choices made by the patient and the injuries 
associated with a procedure may reduce the amount of responsibility jurors assign to 
the physician and, conversely, increase the amount of responsibility assigned to the 
patient.  This is consistent with the theoretical work of Michotte (1941, 1963) and 
Phares and Wilson (1972) which suggests humans establish causality based upon the 
perception of immediate “structured connections.”  When combined with a theory of 
counterfactual thinking, this may help to explain the increased responsibility assigned 
to the patient within the elective conditions. 
Within this scenario, the fact that the physicians informed Joe the procedure 
was unnecessary highlights Joe’s choice as an obvious counterfactual focal point.  
The element of choice allows participants to place themselves in the position of the 
patient when evaluating the outcome.  Participant hindsight bias allows them to 
conclude “I would not have undergone an unnecessary surgery.”  This ability of 
participants to place themselves in the shoes of Joe and determine what their choice 
would have been allows them to draw a conceptual distinction at the point of the 
choice by Joe to undergo the procedure. 
In other words, Joe’s choice to undergo an unnecessary procedure becomes an 
obvious “if only x had been different” point of analysis, which strengthens the 
perception of what Michotte (1941, 1963) and Phares and Wilson (1972) referred to 
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as a “structured connection.”  Joe’s choice to undergo the procedure, despite a lack of 
medical necessity, conceptually creates an easily identifiable “structured connection” 
to the outcome of the procedure, in which the participant, using counterfactual 
thinking, mistakenly interprets Joe’s decision as the “cause” of his injury.   
 Additionally, as noted in earlier discussion, the element of electiveness as 
related to the outcome offers jurors’ an opportunity to distinguish themselves from 
the plaintiff, which allows for “victim-blaming” (Walster, 1966).  These distinctions 
are often drawn out of a psychological necessity for one to feel such an injury would 
not happen to him.  Humans inherently have difficulty accepting that random 
traumatic events could happen to them.  Consequently, when such events do occur, a 
psychological distinction between the individual and the victim allows the individual 
to feel comfortable that the same fate would not fall upon him because of the 
established distinction (e.g. “I would not have undergone an unnecessary surgery”).   
 Finally, this finding highlights a potential strategic focus for plaintiffs in the 
development of the plaintiff narrative during the course of medical malpractice 
litigation.  A carefully constructed narrative that casts a medical procedure as 
medically necessary may lead to a shift in focus on the part of the triers of fact to the 
actions of the physician as opposed to the choices of the patient, thereby enhancing 
the potential for success in persuading the triers of fact to assign a greater portion of 
responsibility to the physician.  Consequently, future research should focus on the 
persuasiveness of narrative elements aimed at casting a medical procedure as 




 Analysis of the data collected in this research supported Bornstein (1998) and 
Bovbjerg et al’s (1991) suggestion that it is more productive to examine the effects of 
extra-legal factors within specific types of litigation.  Specifically, an overall finding 
of this research indicated the manner in which the identified extra-legal factors 
operate in conjunction with the evidence in the assessment and attribution of 
responsibility may vary along the type of litigation due to the unique factors 
associated with each type of litigation, which shape jurors’ attitudes and beliefs about 
the individuals involved and the nature of the incident.  For example, the issue of 
electiveness and medical necessity is unique to medical malpractice as opposed to 
some other types of personal injury litigation.  Additionally, focusing research on 
extra-legal factors to particular types of litigation may produce more practical results 
which can aid in informing trial strategies for those involved in a particular kind of 
litigation.   
 There are limitations to the findings in this research.  While useful for those 
involved in medical malpractice litigation, the conditions of an actual trial could not 
be replicated for the purposes of the research.  Specifically, the research could not 
account for the performance of witnesses along with the emotional impact of their 
testimony and attorney presentational style.  Additionally, real jurors would receive 
greater details surrounding the incident in an actual trial.  
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 Future research should expand upon the framework established herein and 
examine the potential influence of factors including as witness testimony, jury 
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Condition #1:  Joe is a thirty-two year old male who has noticed an abnormal growth 
behind his left ear.  Although the growth is creating no pain, it is clearly visible to 
others and has the appearance of being “abnormal.”  While Joe is not overly concerned 
about any health risks associated with this growth, after a discussion with his fiancé, he 
decides to see his personal physician, Dr. Davis.  Dr. Davis is a physician that Joe 
starting seeing five years ago when Joe was referred to Dr. Davis by a friend.  At that 
time, Joe did not have a physician that he saw regularly for his health.  Joe likes Dr. 
Davis because he feels that Dr. Davis is very personable and straight forward with Joe.  
Joe also likes the fact that Dr. Davis graduated from one of the top medical schools in 
the region and has over a decade of experience in the medical field.     
Upon his visit, Dr. Davis informs Joe that the growth behind his ear is a benign tumor. 
This non-cancerous tumor is essentially a bony tumor of the ear canal that may have 
been caused by an overgrowth of bone. Dr. Davis informs Joe that removal is not 
medically required because the tumor poses no danger or medical problems for Joe.  
Dr. Davis furthermore emphasizes that the tumor will not become cancerous or pose 
any other danger to Joe at any point in the future.  Joe chooses to consult a second 
physician before making his final decision.  He does this, not because he doubts Dr. 
Davis.  Instead, he feels that any health issue that could potentially be serious, 
especially those related to cancer or tumors, warrants a second opinion.  Joe finds a 
second physician through a family member.  The second physician also agrees that 
removal is not medically necessary for the same reasons cited by Dr. Davis.  
Even though surgery is not medically required, Joe elects to have surgery to remove the 
tumor because he feels that its presence negatively impacts his personal appearance to 
others and that he’d be better off just having it removed at this time. 
As Dr. Davis does with all patients undergoing any type of surgery, he indicates to Joe 
that any surgery involves risks.  In doing so, Dr. Davis does not specify any particular 
risks associated with this surgery.  It is simply a common practice of Dr. Davis to tell 
patients that surgeries sometimes have unexpected complications.  Dr. Davis tells Joe 
that there shouldn’t be any cause for concern because he feels that this particular 
surgery should not involve any complications.  He informs Joe that this surgery is a 
relatively common procedure with a short recovery period and that patients typically go 
home the same day that the surgery is performed.  Joe acknowledges this information 
and chooses to proceed with the surgery.  However, Dr. Davis has Joe sign a consent 
form acknowledging that Dr. Davis informed him of the risks involved with the 
surgery, which is common practice for doctors.   
The surgery is performed at the local county hospital and only takes about two to three 
hours to perform. 
Upon injection of a local anesthetic into the upper portion of Joe’s neck and cheek area, 
Dr. Davis mistakenly damages Joe’s facial nerve by improperly implanting the needle.  
When implanting a needle in this part of the face, a doctor typically only has a few 
centimeters to work with in safely introducing the anesthetic.  Unfortunately, Dr. Davis 
simply missed this “safe area” and hit one of Joe’s nerves.  The surgery is completed 
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within three hours and Joe begins a short recovery that is expected to take between four 
and six days.  Joe is allowed to go home immediately after the surgery.  However, Dr. 
Davis tells Joe that he should stay home during recovery and try not to engage in too 
much physical activity.  Finally, before Joe leaves, Dr. Davis informs him of the nerve 
damage that resulted from the anesthetic injection.  Dr. Davis tells Joe that he does not 
believe that it will become a serious problem and that it should heal itself within a few 
weeks.   
On the second day of his recovery, Joe notices problems with numbness on the left side 
of his face and severe pain throughout the rest of his face and decides to return to the 
hospital to consult Dr. Davis on the problem.  After a careful examination, Dr. Davis 
concludes and informs Joe that, although the surgery on the tumor was performed 
successfully, the improper implantation of the needle caused Joe to suffer irreversible 
nerve damage that will result in a permanent facial distortion, which also will cause a 
permanent muscle pain in his face.  Dr. Davis tells Joe that he had hoped the nerve 
damage would heal over time.  However, he indicates that it has now become apparent 
that the damage is permanent.  Unfortunately, there are no medical procedures that can 
repair the nerve damage. 
Dr. Davis regrets the fact that Joe must deal with this nerve damage and acknowledges 
that he did in fact, improperly implant the needle.   
Over time, this facial distortion causes his face to droop on one side causing others to 
believe that his face is deformed.  Joe believes that the deformity radically alters his 
appearance to others in a very negative way.  He believes that, because of it, he has lost 
many friends.  He also indicates that he regularly notices strangers staring at him in 
public places.  Eventually, Joe’s fiancé leaves him.  While Joe acknowledges that his 
fiancé never outright said it, Joe believes that she simply could not deal with the facial 





















Condition Two:  Joe is a thirty-two year old male who has noticed an abnormal growth 
behind his left ear.  Although the growth is creating no pain, it is clearly visible to 
others and has the appearance of being “abnormal.”  While Joe is not overly concerned 
about any health risks associated with this growth, after a discussion with his fiancé, he 
decides to see his personal physician, Dr. Davis.  Dr. Davis is a physician that Joe 
starting seeing five years ago when Joe was referred to Dr. Davis by a friend.  At that 
time, Joe did not have a physician that he saw regularly for his health.  Joe likes Dr. 
Davis because he feels that Dr. Davis is very personable and straight forward with Joe.  
Joe also likes the fact that Dr. Davis graduated from one of the top medical schools in 
the region and has over a decade of experience in the medical field.   
Upon his visit, Dr. Davis informs Joe that the growth behind his ear is a benign tumor. 
This non-cancerous tumor is essentially a bony tumor of the ear canal that may have 
been caused by an overgrowth of bone.  Dr. Davis informs Joe that removal is not 
medically required because the tumor poses no danger or medical problems for Joe.  
Dr. Davis furthermore emphasizes that the tumor will not become cancerous or pose 
any other danger to Joe at any point in the future.  Joe chooses to consult a second 
physician before making his final decision.  He does this, not because he doubts Dr. 
Davis.  Instead, he feels that any health issue that could potentially be serious, 
especially those related to cancer or tumors, warrants a second opinion.  Joe finds a 
second physician through a family member.  The second physician also agrees that 
removal is not medically necessary for the same reasons cited by Dr. Davis.  
Even though surgery is not medically required, Joe elects to have surgery to remove the 
tumor because he feels that its presence negatively impacts his personal appearance to 
others and that he’d be better off just having it removed at this time.   
As Dr. Davis does with all patients undergoing any type of surgery, he indicates to Joe 
that any surgery involves risks.  In doing so, Dr. Davis does not specify any particular 
risks associated with this surgery.  It is simply a common practice of Dr. Davis to tell 
patients that surgeries sometimes have unexpected complications.  Dr. Davis tells Joe 
that there shouldn’t be any cause for concern because he feels that this particular 
surgery should not involve any complications.  He informs Joe that this surgery is a 
relatively common procedure with a short recovery period and that patients typically go 
home the same day that the surgery is performed.  Joe acknowledges this information 
and chooses to proceed with the surgery.  However, Dr. Davis has Joe sign a consent 
form acknowledging that Dr. Davis informed him of the risks involved with the 
surgery, which is common practice for doctors.   
The surgery is performed at the local county hospital and only takes about two to three 
hours to perform. 
Upon injection of a local anesthetic into the upper portion of Joe’s neck and cheek area, 
Dr. Davis mistakenly damages Joe’s facial nerve by improperly implanting the needle.  
When implanting a needle in this part of the face, a doctor typically only has a few 
centimeters to work with in safely introducing the anesthetic.  Unfortunately, Dr. Davis 
simply missed this “safe area” and hit one of Joe’s nerves.  The surgery is completed 
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within three hours and Joe begins a short recovery that is expected to take between four 
and six days.  Joe is allowed to go home immediately after the surgery.  However, Dr. 
Davis tells Joe that he should stay home during recovery and try not to engage in too 
much physical activity.  Finally, before Joe leaves, Dr. Davis informs him of the nerve 
damage that resulted from the anesthetic injection.  Dr. Davis tells Joe that he does not 
believe that it will become a serious problem and that it should heal itself within a few 
weeks.   
On the second day of his recovery, Joe notices problems with numbness on the left side 
of his face and decides to return to the hospital to consult Dr. Davis on the problem.  
After a careful examination, Dr. Davis concludes and informs Joe that, although the 
surgery on the tumor was performed successfully, the improper implantation of the 
needle caused Joe to suffer some nerve damage that will result in a slight facial 
distortion, which will become apparent to others only when he smiles.  Dr. Davis tells 
Joe that he had hoped the nerve damage would heal over time.  However, he indicates 
that it has now become apparent that the damage is permanent.  Unfortunately, there are 
no medical procedures that can repair the nerve damage.  Dr. Davis regrets the fact that 
Joe must deal with this nerve damage and acknowledges that he did in fact, improperly 
implant the needle.   
Other than when Joe smiles, there are no visible indications of nerve damage.  Since his 



























Condition Three:  Joe is a thirty-two year old male who has noticed an abnormal 
growth behind his left ear.  Although the growth is creating no pain, it is clearly visible 
to others and has the appearance of being “abnormal.”  While Joe is not overly 
concerned about any health risks associated with this growth, after a discussion with his 
fiancé, he decides to see his personal physician, Dr. Davis.  Dr. Davis is a physician 
that Joe starting seeing five years ago when Joe was referred to Dr. Davis by a friend.  
At that time, Joe did not have a physician that he saw regularly for his health.  Joe likes 
Dr. Davis because he feels that Dr. Davis is very personable and straight forward with 
Joe.  Joe also likes the fact that Dr. Davis graduated from one of the top medical 
schools in the region and has over a decade of experience in the medical field.   
Upon his visit, Dr. Davis informs Joe that the growth behind his ear is a benign tumor. 
This non-cancerous tumor is essentially a bony tumor of the ear canal that may have 
been caused by an overgrowth of bone.  Dr. Davis informs Joe that surgery is medically 
necessary.  While the tumor is not cancerous, if it is not removed, it will continue to 
grow and cause permanent hearing loss.  Furthermore, continued growth of the tumor 
will lead to extraordinary pain throughout the left side of Joe’s face.  Joe chooses to 
consult a second physician before making his final decision.  He does this, not because 
he doubts Dr. Davis.  Instead, he feels that any health issue that could potentially be 
serious, especially those related to cancer or tumors, warrants a second opinion.  Joe 
finds a second physician through a family member.  The second physician also agrees 
that removal is medically necessary for the same reasons cited by Dr. Davis.  Therefore, 
Joe agrees to have the surgery performed.   
As Dr. Davis does with all patients undergoing any type of surgery, he indicates to Joe 
that any surgery involves risks.  In doing so, Dr. Davis does not specify any particular 
risks associated with this surgery.  It is simply a common practice of Dr. Davis to tell 
patients that surgeries sometimes have unexpected complications.  Dr. Davis tells Joe 
that there shouldn’t be any cause for concern because he feels that this particular 
surgery should not involve any complications.  He informs Joe that this surgery is a 
relatively common procedure with a short recovery period and that patients typically go 
home the same day that the surgery is performed.  Joe acknowledges this information 
and chooses to proceed with the surgery.  However, Dr. Davis has Joe sign a consent 
form acknowledging that Dr. Davis informed him of the risks involved with the 
surgery, which is common practice for doctors. 
The surgery is performed at the local county hospital and only takes about two to three 
hours to perform. 
Upon injection of a local anesthetic into the upper portion of Joe’s neck and cheek area, 
Dr. Davis mistakenly damages Joe’s facial nerve by improperly implanting the needle.  
When implanting a needle in this part of the face, a doctor typically only has a few 
centimeters to work with in safely introducing the anesthetic.  Unfortunately, Dr. Davis 
simply missed this “safe area” and hit one of Joe’s nerves.  The surgery is completed 
within three hours and Joe begins a short recovery that is expected to take between four 
and six days.  Joe is allowed to go home immediately after the surgery.  However, Dr. 
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Davis tells Joe that he should stay home during recovery and try not to engage in too 
much physical activity.  Finally, before Joe leaves, Dr. Davis informs him of the nerve 
damage that resulted from the anesthetic injection.  Dr. Davis tells Joe that he does not 
believe that it will become a serious problem and that it should heal itself within a few 
weeks.   
On the second day of his recovery, Joe notices problems with numbness on the left side 
of his face and severe pain throughout the rest of his face and decides to return to the 
hospital to consult Dr. Davis on the problem.  After a careful examination, Dr. Davis 
concludes and informs Joe that, although the surgery on the tumor was performed 
successfully, the improper implantation of the needle caused Joe to suffer irreversible 
nerve damage that will result in a permanent facial distortion, which will also cause a 
permanent muscle pain in his face.  Dr. Davis tells Joe that he had hoped the nerve 
damage would heal over time.  However, he indicates that it has now become apparent 
that the damage is permanent.  Unfortunately, there are no medical procedures that can 
repair the nerve damage. 
Dr. Davis regrets the fact that Joe must deal with this nerve damage and acknowledges 
that he did in fact, improperly implant the needle.   
Over time, this facial distortion causes his face to droop on one side causing others to 
believe that his face is deformed.  Joe believes that the deformity radically alters his 
appearance to others in a very negative way.  He believes that, because of it, he has lost 
many friends.  He also indicates that he regularly notices strangers staring at him in 
public places.  Eventually, Joe’s fiancé leaves him.  While Joe acknowledges that his 
fiancé never outright said it, Joe believes that she simply could not deal with the facial 























Scenario Four:  Joe is a thirty-two year old male who has noticed an abnormal growth 
behind his left ear.  Although the growth is creating no pain, it is clearly visible to 
others and has the appearance of being “abnormal.”  While Joe is not overly concerned 
about any health risks associated with this growth, after a discussion with his fiancé, he 
decides to see his personal physician, Dr. Davis.  Dr. Davis is a physician that Joe 
starting seeing five years ago when Joe was referred to Dr. Davis by a friend.  At that 
time, Joe did not have a physician that he saw regularly for his health.  Joe likes Dr. 
Davis because he feels that Dr. Davis is very personable and straight forward with Joe.  
Joe also likes the fact that Dr. Davis graduated from one of the top medical schools in 
the region and has over a decade of experience in the medical field.   
Upon his visit, Dr. Davis informs Joe that the growth behind his ear is a benign tumor. 
This non-cancerous tumor is essentially a bony tumor of the ear canal that may have 
been caused by an overgrowth of bone.  Dr. Davis informs Joe. that surgery is 
medically necessary.  While the tumor is not cancerous, if it is not removed, it will 
continue to grow and cause permanent hearing loss.  Furthermore, continued growth of 
the tumor will lead to extraordinary pain throughout the left side of Joe’s face.  Joe 
chooses to consult a second physician before making his final decision.  He does this, 
not because he doubts Dr. Davis.  Instead, he feels that any health issue that could 
potentially be serious, especially those related to cancer or tumors, warrants a second 
opinion.  Joe finds a second physician through a family member.  The second physician 
also agrees that removal is medically necessary for the same reasons cited by Dr. Davis.  
Therefore, Joe agrees to have the surgery performed.   
As Dr. Davis does with all patients undergoing any type of surgery, he indicates to Joe 
that any surgery involves risks.  In doing so, Dr. Davis does not specify any particular 
risks associated with this surgery.  It is simply a common practice of Dr. Davis to tell 
patients that surgeries sometimes have unexpected complications.  Dr. Davis tells Joe 
that there shouldn’t be any cause for concern because he feels that this particular 
surgery should not involve any complications.  He informs Joe that this surgery is a 
relatively common procedure with a short recovery period and that patients typically go 
home the same day that the surgery is performed.  Joe acknowledges this information 
and chooses to proceed with the surgery.  However, Dr. Davis has Joe sign a consent 
form acknowledging that Dr. Davis informed him of the risks involved with the 
surgery, which is common practice for doctors. 
The surgery is performed at the local county hospital and only takes about two to three 
hours to perform. 
Upon injection of a local anesthetic into the upper portion of Joe’s neck and cheek area, 
Dr. Davis. mistakenly damages Joe’s facial nerve by improperly implanting the needle.  
When implanting a needle in this part of the face, a doctor typically only has a few 
centimeters to work with in safely introducing the anesthetic.  Unfortunately, Dr. Davis 
simply missed this “safe area” and hit one of Joe’s nerves.  The surgery is completed 
within three hours and Joe begins a short recovery that is expected to take between four 
and six days.  Joe is allowed to go home immediately after the surgery.  However, Dr. 
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Davis tells Joe that he should stay home during recovery and try not to engage in too 
much physical activity.  Finally, before Joe leaves, Dr. Davis informs him of the nerve 
damage that resulted from the anesthetic injection.  Dr. Davis tells Joe that he does not 
believe that it will become a serious problem and that it should heal itself within a few 
weeks.   
On the second day of his recovery, Joe notices problems with numbness on the left side 
of his face and decides to return to the hospital to consult Dr. Davis on the problem.  
After a careful examination, Dr. Davis concludes and informs Joe that, although the 
surgery on the tumor was performed successfully, the improper implantation of the 
needle caused Joe to suffer some nerve damage that will result in a slight facial 
distortion, which will become apparent to others only when he smiles.  Dr. Davis tells 
Joe that he had hoped the nerve damage would heal over time.  However, he indicates 
that it has now become apparent that the damage is permanent.  Unfortunately, there are 
no medical procedures that can repair the nerve damage.   
Dr. Davis regrets the fact that Joe must deal with this nerve damage and acknowledges 
that he did in fact, improperly implant the needle.   
Other than when Joe smiles, there are no visible indications of nerve damage.  Since his 

















1)  Directions:  Please read following paragraph describing an incident that occurred 
during a medical procedure and then move on to the second section. 
 
Joe is a thirty-two year old male who has noticed an abnormal growth behind his left 
ear.  Although the growth is creating no pain, it is clearly visible to others and has the 
appearance of being “abnormal.”  While Joe is not overly concerned about any health 
risks associated with this growth, after a discussion with his fiancé, he decides to see 
his personal physician, Dr. Davis.  Dr. Davis is a physician that Joe starting seeing five 
years ago when Joe was referred to Dr. Davis by a friend.  At that time, Joe did not 
have a physician that he saw regularly for his health.  Joe likes Dr. Davis because he 
feels that Dr. Davis is very personable and straight forward with Joe.  Joe also likes the 
fact that Dr. Davis graduated from one of the top medical schools in the region and has 
over a decade of experience in the medical field.     
Upon his visit, Dr. Davis informs Joe that the growth behind his ear is a benign tumor. 
This non-cancerous tumor is essentially a bony tumor of the ear canal that may have 
been caused by an overgrowth of bone. Dr. Davis informs Joe that removal is not 
medically required because the tumor poses no danger or medical problems for Joe.  
Dr. Davis furthermore emphasizes that the tumor will not become cancerous or pose 
any other danger to Joe at any point in the future.  Joe chooses to consult a second 
physician before making his final decision.  He does this, not because he doubts Dr. 
Davis.  Instead, he feels that any health issue that could potentially be serious, 
especially those related to cancer or tumors, warrants a second opinion.  Joe finds a 
second physician through a family member.  The second physician also agrees that 
removal is not medically necessary for the same reasons cited by Dr. Davis.  
Even though surgery is not medically required, Joe elects to have surgery to remove the 
tumor because he feels that its presence negatively impacts his personal appearance to 
others and that he’d be better of just having it removed at this time. 
As Dr. Davis does with all patients undergoing any type of surgery, he indicates to Joe 
that any surgery involves risks.  In doing so, Dr. Davis does not specify any particular 
risks associated with this surgery.  It is simply a common practice of Dr. Davis to tell 
patients that surgeries sometimes have unexpected complications.  Dr. Davis tells Joe 
that there shouldn’t be any cause for concern because he feels that this particular 
surgery should not involve any complications.  He informs Joe that this surgery is a 
relatively common procedure with a short recovery period and that patients typically go 
home the same day that the surgery is performed.  Joe acknowledges this information 
and chooses to proceed with the surgery.  However, Dr. Davis has Joe sign a consent 
form acknowledging that Dr. Davis informed him of the risks involved with the 
surgery, which is common practice for doctors.   
The surgery is performed at the local county hospital and only takes about two to three 
hours to perform. 
Upon injection of a local anesthetic into the upper portion of Joe’s neck and cheek area, 
Dr. Davis mistakenly damages Joe’s facial nerve by improperly implanting the needle.  
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When implanting a needle in this part of the face, a doctor typically only has a few 
centimeters to work with in safely introducing the anesthetic.  Unfortunately, Dr. Davis 
simply missed this “safe area” and hit one of Joe’s nerves.  The surgery is completed 
within three hours and Joe begins a short recovery that is expected to take between four 
and six days.  Joe is allowed to go home immediately after the surgery.  However, Dr. 
Davis tells Joe that he should stay home during recovery and try not to engage in too 
much physical activity.  Finally, before Joe leaves, Dr. Davis informs him of the nerve 
damage that resulted from the anesthetic injection.  Dr. Davis tells Joe that he does not 
believe that it will become a serious problem and that it should heal itself within a few 
weeks.   
On the second day of his recovery, Joe notices problems with numbness on the left side 
of his face and severe pain throughout the rest of his face and decides to return to the 
hospital to consult Dr. Davis on the problem.  Dr. Davis informs Joe that, although the 
surgery on the tumor was performed successfully, the improper implantation of the 
needle caused Joe to suffer irreversible nerve damage that will result in a permanent 
facial distortion, which also will cause a permanent muscle pain in his face.  Dr. Davis 
tells Joe that he had hoped the nerve damage would heal over time.  However, he 
indicates that it has now become apparent that the damage is permanent.  
Unfortunately, there are no medical procedures that can repair the nerve damage. 
Dr. Davis regrets the fact that Joe must deal with this nerve damage and acknowledges 
that he did in fact, improperly implant the needle.   
Over time, this facial distortion causes his face to droop on one side causing others to 
believe that his face is deformed.  Joe believes that the deformity radically alters his 
appearance to others in a very negative way.  He believes that, because of it, he has lost 
many friends.  He also indicates that he regularly notices strangers staring at him in 
public places.  Eventually, Joe’s fiancé leaves him.  While Joe acknowledges that his 
fiancé never outright said it, Joe believes that she simply could not deal with the facial 


















2)  Directions:  Your task is to determine how much responsibility, if any, should be 
attributed to the patient and/or the physician for the injuries sustained during this 
medical procedure.  In the previously-described situation, both Joe and Dr. Davis 
agree that the needle was improperly planted.  In the legal setting, responsibility is 
assigned to physicians based upon the following criteria:  (1) the physician owed a 
duty of care to another, which is established once the physician agrees to provide care 
for the patient; (2) the physician violated the standard of care that should be expected 
in such procedures; and (3 & 4) the violation of the standard of care caused the 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff.  A physician who holds him/herself out to be a 
specialist in a particular field of medicine has a duty to use his/her skill and 
knowledge as a specialist in a manner consistent with the special degree of skill and 
knowledge ordinarily possessed by other specialists in the same field of expertise at 
the time of the diagnosis and/or treatment.  A violation of this duty is negligence.  
You may also decide that the patient bears responsibility for the injuries sustained 
during the procedure.  Decisions regarding who is responsible will not impact 
whether or not the patient receives compensation for his injuries nor will it impact 
how much compensation is received. 
 
a. In the spaces provided below, please provide a percentage of responsibility for 
the injuries sustained during the medical procedure that you believe should be 
attributed to each of the parties involved.  For example, if you believe Dr. 
Davis was primarily responsible for Joe’s injuries but Joe also bears some 
responsibility, you might assign 80% to Dr. Davis and 20% to Joe.  Both 
percentages must add up to 100%.  If you believe that no one was responsible, 
please circle that option below. 
 
Joe_____________________  Dr. Davis________________________ 
 
 No one is responsible. 
 
 














On the scale below, please indicate how certain you feel about the degree of 
responsibility that you have attributed to Joe. 
 
Very Uncertain        1       2       3       4       5       6       7        Very Certain 














On the scale below, please indicate how certain you feel about the degree of 
responsibility that you have attributed to Dr. Davis. 
 
Very Uncertain        1       2       3       4       5       6       7        Very Certain 
 
 
d. If you indicated that no one is responsible, please explain why you believe 
this.  If you indicated that either Joe and/or Dr. Davis was responsible, please 













On the scale below, please indicate how certain you feel in your decision that 
no one was responsible. 
 


















f. On the scale below, please indicate how complicated or difficult of a surgery 
you believe the surgery performed by Dr. Davis is. 
 
 




Please explain why you chose the particular degree to which you believe this 


















h. Is there any other information you think is missing or that you would like to  
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i. On the scale below, please indicate how severe you believe the injuries 
sustained   
      by Joe (the patient) are. 
 
Not Severe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Very Severe 
  
 
 Please explain why you indicated that particular degree of severity in the    













j. On the scale below, please indicate the degree of sympathy that you feel for 
Joe    (the patient) in this scenario. 
 
No sympathy 1 2 3 4 5 6       7  A lot of sympathy 
 
Please explain why you selected the particular degree of sympathy for Joe in 










k. On the scale below, please indicate the degree of sympathy that you feel for 
Dr.  
      Davis (the doctor) in this scenario. 
 
No sympathy 1 2 3 4 5 6     7    A lot of sympathy 
 
Please explain why you selected the particular degree of sympathy for Dr. 













l.  Medical procedures can often be characterized as falling into one of two    
      categories.  Procedures out of medical necessity are those in which the patient    
      must undergo surgery to avoid sustaining severe injuries.  Elective procedures   
      include those in which the patient may decline surgery without facing any 
severe  
 medical consequences or those in which the patient chooses to undergo 
surgery     
 even when it is not medically necessary.  On the scale below, please indicate 
the  
 degree to which you believe Joe’s procedure could be considered elective. 
 
Not Elective     1     2     3      4     5     6     7    Elective 
 
Please explain why you selected the particular degree of elective/not elective 











m. Is there anything else about this incident (either stated or unstated) that you 
believe is significant in determining the responsibility that any party may or 











































3)  Directions:  Please indicate whether or not you agree or disagree with the 
following statements regarding your experiences with your physician. 
 
1.  Are you currently seeing a physician for an ongoing health condition?   
 
 Yes_____  No_____ 
 
2. Do you have a physician that you see regularly or prefer to see, for physicals 
and/or other health-related issues? 
    
 Yes_____  No_____ 
 
3.   IF you answered NO to both of the above questions, please skip to section 4. If 
you   
answered YES to either question, please continue below.  The following questions 
assess your opinions of your interactions with your physician.  Please indicate the 
degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
a. The physician typically goes straight to my medical problem without first 
greeting me. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
b. The physician typically greets me pleasantly 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
c. The physician seems to pay attention as I describe my conditions. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
d. The physician makes me feel as if I could talk about any type of problem. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
e. The physician asks questions that are too personal. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
f. The physician handles me roughly during examinations. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
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g. The physician typically gives me an explanation of what is happening during 
the examination. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
h. The physician typically explains the reasons why the treatment was 
recommended for me. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
i. I feel the physician typically diagnoses my condition without enough 
information 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
j. The physician has recommended treatments that are unrealistic for me. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
k. The physician considers my individual needs when treating my conditions. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
l. The physician seems to rush during my visits. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
m. The physician behaves in a professional and respectful manner toward me. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
n. The physician seems to brush off my questions. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
o. The physician often uses words that I do not understand. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
p. The physician usually does not give me all the information I think I should 
have 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
q. The physician has criticized me for not taking care of myself. 
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      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
r. I would recommend this physician to a friend. 
 
      Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
s. I would return to this physician for the future health care. 
   Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
 
4)  Directions:  Please carefully read each of the following statements and indicate 
the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement. 
 
a. There are far too many frivolous lawsuits today. 
 
Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
b. I would not hesitate to file a lawsuit if I felt injured by another party. 
 
Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
c. The large number of lawsuits shows that our society is breaking down. 
 
Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
d. Most people who sue others in court have legitimate grievances. 
 
Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
e. The money awards that juries are awarding in civil cases are too large. 
 
Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree  
 
f. I often make important decisions with my heart, rather than my head. 
 
Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
g. People these days are always trying to blame others for their misfortune. 
 
Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
h. People often try to take advantage of being victims. 
 
Strongly Disagree      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Strongly Agree 
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5)  Directions:  Please carefully read each of the following questions and circle the 
most appropriate answer. 
 
1. How would you rate the quality of care provided by our nation’s healthcare 
system?  Would you say it was excellent, good, fair, or poor? 
 




2. Do you think the quality of care provided by our nation’s healthcare system 
has gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same in the past five years? 
 




3. What percentage of medical malpractice lawsuits do you think are justified? 
 
Less than half the time          Half the time           More than half the time Don’t know 
 
 
4. What percentage of medical malpractice lawsuits do you think are won by the 
patient? 
 
Less than half the time          Half the time           More than half the time Don’t know 
 
 
5. The following contains a list of several medical professionals and 
organizations.  Please indicate how caring you think each one is about their 
patients’ health and well-being. 
 
a)  Doctors: 
 















6)  Participant Information:  Check each of the appropriate answers.  
 
1.  Sex:  
 
Male_____  Female_____ 
 
2.  Ethnicity: 
 
 White_____ African-American_____ Asian_____ Hispanic_____
  
 
Native American_____ Other_____ 
 
3.  Age:_____ 
 
4.  Are you currently employed in the medical field?     Yes_____     No_____ 
 
4a.  If you are currently employed in the medical field, please describe what 
your   












5a.  If you are related to or close friends with anyone employed in the medical 









6.  On average, how often would you say that you see a physician regarding your own   


























Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
13083.501a 13 1006.423 1.966 .033
120496.776 1 120496.776 235.422 .000
397.229 1 397.229 .776 .381
8490.139 7 1212.877 2.370 .029














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .225 (Adjusted R Squared = .111)a. 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
5779.808a 6 963.301 1.748 .118
181765.430 1 181765.430 329.883 .000
1473.014 1 1473.014 2.673 .105
2303.886 3 767.962 1.394 .249














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
5943.155a 7 849.022 1.529 .167
113755.660 1 113755.660 204.920 .000
467.450 1 467.450 .842 .361
1028.809 4 257.202 .463 .762














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .102 (Adjusted R Squared = .035)a. 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
5334.174a 9 592.686 1.033 .420
181324.418 1 181324.418 316.000 .000
1179.148 1 1179.148 2.055 .155
1721.443 5 344.289 .600 .700














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
6668.596a 12 555.716 .961 .492
137132.182 1 137132.182 237.188 .000
2413.846 1 2413.846 4.175 .044
2368.008 7 338.287 .585 .766














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .115 (Adjusted R Squared = -.005)a. 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
3825.014a 8 478.127 .819 .588
197154.646 1 197154.646 337.670 .000
1065.615 1 1065.615 1.825 .180
441.202 4 110.300 .189 .944














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .066 (Adjusted R Squared = -.015)a. 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
8165.402a 10 816.540 1.487 .157
183417.581 1 183417.581 334.092 .000
934.297 1 934.297 1.702 .195
4697.083 5 939.417 1.711 .140














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
6586.906a 9 731.878 1.306 .244
343971.514 1 343971.514 614.022 .000
1143.599 1 1143.599 2.041 .156
2592.538 4 648.134 1.157 .335














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
8505.623a 13 654.279 1.160 .322
143734.123 1 143734.123 254.914 .000
1838.908 1 1838.908 3.261 .074
2713.396 7 387.628 .687 .682














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .146 (Adjusted R Squared = .020)a. 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
10661.216a 10 1066.122 2.044 .037
95840.099 1 95840.099 183.751 .000
1811.374 1 1811.374 3.473 .066
4336.116 5 867.223 1.663 .152














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
5271.619a 12 439.302 .740 .709
189052.493 1 189052.493 318.348 .000
576.868 1 576.868 .971 .327
1292.999 6 215.500 .363 .901














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .091 (Adjusted R Squared = -.032)a. 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
6217.235a 14 444.088 .744 .724
265763.389 1 265763.389 445.435 .000
426.334 1 426.334 .715 .400
833.499 7 119.071 .200 .985














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .107 (Adjusted R Squared = -.037)a. 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
4759.212a 8 594.902 1.037 .414
185692.532 1 185692.532 323.606 .000
124.463 1 124.463 .217 .642
507.840 4 126.960 .221 .926














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.





Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
8234.613a 9 914.957 1.687 .103
206369.709 1 206369.709 380.556 .000
6298.640 1 6298.640 11.615 .001
2743.923 5 548.785 1.012 .415














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .142 (Adjusted R Squared = .058)a. 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
6227.851a 11 566.168 .982 .469
228050.333 1 228050.333 395.487 .000
1563.456 1 1563.456 2.711 .103
2586.319 5 517.264 .897 .487














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
6640.018a 12 553.335 .957 .496
157535.505 1 157535.505 272.327 .000
1675.857 1 1675.857 2.897 .092
1503.075 7 214.725 .371 .917














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .114 (Adjusted R Squared = -.005)a. 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
9506.573a 11 864.234 1.600 .112
102742.778 1 102742.778 190.193 .000
2840.827 1 2840.827 5.259 .024
5631.018 6 938.503 1.737 .121














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
6292.214a 11 572.019 .993 .459
134045.819 1 134045.819 232.752 .000
458.512 1 458.512 .796 .375
2527.729 6 421.288 .732 .625














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .108 (Adjusted R Squared = -.001)a. 
 
 
 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: Davis  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 5799.307(a) 10 579.931 1.009 .442 
Intercept 135600.057 1 135600.057 235.824 .000 
Elective 510.813 1 510.813 .888 .348 
3S 1325.606 5 265.121 .461 .804 
Elective * 3S 1234.697 4 308.674 .537 .709 
Error 52325.448 91 575.005     
Total 642877.000 102       
Corrected Total 58124.755 101       











 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: Davis  
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7828.278(a) 13 602.175 1.054 .410 
Intercept 165236.726 1 165236.726 289.102 .000 
Elective 1041.629 1 1041.629 1.822 .180 
4A 3730.900 7 532.986 .933 .486 
Elective*4A 341.984 5 68.397 .120 .988 
Error 50296.477 88 571.551     
Total 642877.000 102       
Corrected Total 58124.755 101       
a  R Squared = .135 (Adjusted R Squared = .007) 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
8933.030a 14 638.074 1.128 .345
310251.567 1 310251.567 548.708 .000
3740.498 1 3740.498 6.615 .012
3079.650 7 439.950 .778 .607














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
10097.657a 14 721.261 1.307 .220
265728.570 1 265728.570 481.361 .000
4927.030 1 4927.030 8.925 .004
5792.859 7 827.551 1.499 .178














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .174 (Adjusted R Squared = .041)a. 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
13457.834a 13 1035.218 2.040 .026
254565.141 1 254565.141 501.528 .000
7314.516 1 7314.516 14.411 .000
5550.881 7 792.983 1.562 .157














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .232 (Adjusted R Squared = .118)a. 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
8257.063a 14 589.790 1.029 .433
262262.238 1 262262.238 457.547 .000
1478.330 1 1478.330 2.579 .112
2502.286 7 357.469 .624 .735














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
8883.782a 14 634.556 1.121 .352
199663.646 1 199663.646 352.770 .000
742.758 1 742.758 1.312 .255
1150.434 7 164.348 .290 .956














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
8401.781a 13 646.291 1.144 .335
243985.805 1 243985.805 431.807 .000
1921.642 1 1921.642 3.401 .069
4248.067 7 606.867 1.074 .387














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




















Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
9536.978a 9 1059.664 2.006 .047
212365.991 1 212365.991 402.111 .000
1946.418 1 1946.418 3.686 .058
2325.458 4 581.365 1.101 .361














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .164 (Adjusted R Squared = .082)a. 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
9008.437a 8 1126.055 2.132 .040
293433.149 1 293433.149 555.605 .000
851.551 1 851.551 1.612 .207
3633.487 4 908.372 1.720 .152














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
10807.464a 8 1350.933 2.655 .011
259892.802 1 259892.802 510.808 .000
3623.579 1 3623.579 7.122 .009
4500.250 4 1125.063 2.211 .074














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .186 (Adjusted R Squared = .116)a. 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
5595.476a 8 699.435 1.238 .286
290608.610 1 290608.610 514.505 .000
2940.250 1 2940.250 5.206 .025
956.655 4 239.164 .423 .791














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.





Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
3827.456a 6 637.909 1.116 .359
95676.620 1 95676.620 167.398 .000
639.349 1 639.349 1.119 .293
252.206 3 84.069 .147 .931














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .066 (Adjusted R Squared = .007)a. 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
4943.674a 6 823.946 1.472 .196
102673.596 1 102673.596 183.411 .000
694.218 1 694.218 1.240 .268
1396.909 3 465.636 .832 .480














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Davis
13862.987a 9 1540.332 3.202 .002
163549.068 1 163549.068 339.944 .000
445.647 1 445.647 .926 .338
9877.001 4 2469.250 5.132 .001














of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
R Squared = .239 (Adjusted R Squared = .164)a. 
 
 
 
